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1. Introduction 
The objective of this paper is to discuss the relationship between competences and the 
internationalization of R&D sites in a Swedish ICT company- ICT21. It portrays the interplay 
between the availability of competences in the home country as well as in the host country, with the 
specific strategy of the firm and the changes in the environment.  
The paper starts by providing an overview of the education system of Sweden as this may provide 
some explanations to why ICT2 has established some of their R&D labs abroad, particularly in 
China. Through in-depth interviews with ICT2 in different world locations (Sweden, South Africa 
and China), the paper explores the interplay between globalization of innovation and competence 
building, from two perspectives: 
a) To what extent the access to qualified human resources may be the driver for the location of 
R&D labs abroad? – competences as a driver 
b) Which competences globally dispersed companies need and how are they managed? – 
competences as an enabler 
The paper is structured as follows. First, it provides an overview of the educational and research 
system of Sweden. It will focus particularly on the provision of qualified human capital. Section 3 is 
centred on the relationship between globalization of innovation and competences in ICT2 and it is 
organized around the two previous questions. Last section of the paper concludes with some 
reflections on the role of competences in GINs, based on the ICT2 experience.  
 
 
2. Competence building in Swedeni 
2.1 Universities and research centers 
 
The university sector in Sweden is dominated by approximately 10 universities which are responsible for 
almost all R&D performance in the country: The Karolinska Institute, Chalmers University of Technology, 
Uppsala University, Lund University, Gothenborg University, the Royal Institute of Technology (KTH), 
Stockholm University, Linköping University and Luleå University being the most important ones. The size 
of the universities in terms of the number of students (FTE) in 2008 is plotted next: 
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Table 1: Number of students enrolled in the 10 largest Swedish Universities (2008). 
University Number of Students FTE 
Lund University 24600 
Gothenburg University 24100 
Stockholm University 22400 
Uppsala University 19900 
Linköping Univ. 16900 
Umeå 15600 
Linnaeus Univ. 15000 
Royal Institute of Technology (KTH) 11700 
Chalmers 8471 
Source: Swedish Higher Education Authority (2009) 
 
With few exceptions (Karolinska Institute and the Royal Institute of Technology), most of the 
funding of Swedish Universities comes from the public sources (regional and national government 
and EU) and only a small proportion (approximately 11%) is funded by private firms and 
foundations, as shown next: 
 
Graph 1: Sources of funding of Swedish universities. 
 
Source: Author own elaboration with data from SNAHE (2010). 
Additionally, Sweden has a number of University Colleges (Swedish Högskola) that provide 
degrees at graduate (University diplomas and Bachelor degrees) and post-graduate level (Master 
and Doctorate). In comparison with Universities, University colleges are usually specialized in just 
one academic discipline. For example, Blekinge Institute of Technology and Mälardalen University 
are specialized in Engineering, while Stockholm School of Economics is in Business and 
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Economics and Malmö University (although is currently diversifying) has a strong focus on 
Medicine.  
With regards to Research Institutes, the Swedish R&D institute sector (for example technical 
centers or specialized research agencies) is one of the smallest in the OECD, mostly due to the fact 
that almost all public R&D investments go to the Universities in Sweden (Marklund et al, 2004). 
Despite their small size, they are active in a variety of industries. Some of the most important ones 
are the Swedish Defense Research Agency (FOI) (aprox. 1250 employees), the industrial research 
institutes (jointly owned by the government and industrial associations, employing aprox. 2100 
employees) and other government research institutes and agencies like the Swedish Institute for 
Infectious Disease Control or the National Institute for Working Life, employing aprox. 430 
researchers full time (VINNOVA, 2006).  
 
2.2 Tertiary education in Sweden 
Although the proportion of higher educated people in Sweden is high, Sweden is not at the top of 
the OECD rankings that measure the proportion of higher educated people to the total population. 
Table 2 summarizes the number of students participating in tertiary education in 2006 in total and as 
a proportion of the population between 20-26. 
 
Table 2: Number of students enrolled in Tertiary education (all cycles) and number of Graduates (2006) 
 Students enrolled in tertiary education Graduates 2006 
 
Total numbers % population 
20-29 
Total numbers % population 
20-29 
In any field 422614 39,1 60762 5,6 
In Science, Maths and 
Computing 
43910 3,8 -- -- 
In Engineering, 
Manufacturing and 
Construction 
68846 6,4 -- -- 
Source: Eurostat (2009) 
 
Since 2008, tertiary education in Sweden has been divided into three cycles: Bachelor, Master and 
PhD, which is showing different trends over time. While the number of degrees awarded to the first 
and second cycle has decreased over time, the number of doctorates awarded has slightly increased, 
particularly in the last year for which data is available (2008). 
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Graph 2: Number of degrees awarded in tertiary education (1990-2008). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: SNAHE (2010) 
 
The declining trend observed in the first and second cycle is not a good indicator, particularly 
taking into account the role that competences play in the emergence and development of Global 
innovation networks: we may expect, that countries and regions with higher proportion of qualified 
human resources will be also the ones better positioned to attract GINs and to participate in GINs. 
However, one may expect this negative trend to reverse in the next future as 2008 showed, for the 
first time since 2003, an increase in the number of FTE in first and second cycles which may 
translate into an increase in the number of graduates in the coming years.  
 
Graph 3: Number of FTE in first and second cycle of tertiary education (1993-2008). 
 
Source: SNAHE (2010) 
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2.3 Researchers and R&D personnel in the Swedish NIS 
The proportion of researchers and R&D personal in the Swedish innovation system has decreased 
slightly since 2005 and, in 2008 the proportion was quite similar to that of 2004. This, again, is not 
a good sign if one takes into account that one of the most important determinants in the location of 
innovation activities in a certain country or region is the availability of competences (qualified 
human capital). 
 
 
Graph 4: Total researchers and R&D personnel per thousand total employment 2004/2008). 
 
Source: Authors’ own elaboration with data from OECD (2010) 
 
The business sector has traditionally the most important employer of R&D personnel in general and 
of researchers in particular and its importance in relative terms has increased over time, as next 
graphs show: 
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Graphs 5: Percentage distribution of R&D personnel (FTE) between Business enterprises, Higher Education 
and Government in Sweden (2004 and 2008). 
 
 
Source: Authors’ own elaboration with data from OECD (2010) 
The observed decreasing trends in the numbers of graduates in tertiary education as well as in the 
number of researchers available for the industry has important implications for large multinationals 
such as ICT2. This will be discussed in the next section.  
 
 
3. Globalization of innovation at ICT2 and competence building 
 
3.1 General overview of the firm 
ICT2 is a world-leader provider of telecommunications equipment and services. ICT2’s main 
business is the provision of network equipment and services for telecommunication. ICT2 is 
organized around 4 business units: multimedia, global services, mobile systems and networks.  
The R&D sites (20-25) are in proximity with the main manufacturing units, which indicates a high 
degree of overlap between the global production network and the global innovation network of 
ICT2. In terms of locations, ICT2 has important R&D facilities in countries like Germany, Canada, 
USA (Silicon Valley), Ireland, Hungary and China. Currently the three largest ICT2’s R&D 
facilities in the world for the radio division are the one in Sweden, the one in the Silicon Valley 
(USA) and the one in China. 
In the past 10 years the number of European sites of ICT2 has declined to gain more efficiency. 
According to one of the interviewee: “small sites with 100-200 people are not attractive places for 
people as they do not grow”. While the number of sites in Europe has decrease, presence in USA 
remains unchanged while new R&D sites within the emerging economies, like India and China 
have been opened.  
In general, the R&D activities and the most specialized competences (in the internal network) 
remain concentrated in the sites located in Europe and USA but, according to the interviewee, 
China has upgraded rapidly as an important R&D site inside ICT2. The reason for this move 
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towards large Asian economies is related to being in proximity to the local market and adaptation of 
the products to the local demands and standards. 
 
3.2 Competences as a driver of globalization of innovation in ICT2 
When enquired about the drivers for offshoring of production and innovation in Southern countries, 
the CEO of ICT2 indicated that the main reason for off-shoring innovation in Southern countries is 
to gain the proximity to the market and second to access specific competences.  
The research conducted in R&D centers worldwide can be both for the development of a 
completely new product or service for the whole corporation as well as for the adaptation of an 
existing product to a local market.  
An example of the development of a local solution for local needs could be the development of 
radio equipment in rural areas in India that would be conducted completely by ICT2 India. Another 
example of a development in which the subsidiaries will be involved could be a technology 
developed in US that needs to be adapted to the standards and requirement of the market in which 
ICT2 is commercializing that technology.  
Access to competences and more explicitly, access to “domain competences” is regarded as the 
second main driver for the location of R&D activities abroad. In the last decade or so, ICT2 has 
followed a clear strategy of reducing the number of R&D sites worldwide while increasing the size 
of the remaining sites (so, less sites bur larger ones). This has occurred in parallel with the 
increasing technological complexity of ICT products and services, which demands a larger variety 
of skills (from software developers, to radio experts, computer engineers, etc). Accessing domain 
competences is on of reasons for ICT2 to locate one of the largest corporate R&D sites in China, 
but is not the only one. When asked if they would change their strategy if they could find the 
required number of skilled people with the desired qualifications in Sweden, our interviewee 
responded that they would not change their strategy, as the main driver for locating the R&D lab in China 
continues to be the access to one of their largest markets and the development of products and services for 
that market. So, while competence scarcity in the home country (Sweden) plays a role, it is a 
combination of large market opportunities together with the availability of highly qualified 
personnel at a lower cost, what makes China (and more precisely Beijing) one of the most important 
locations of R&D sites in ICT2.  
In the case of China since 1995, different R&D sites has been established all of the country with a 
focus on different fields. The centre in Chengdu is regarded as a response to the “China’s western 
development strategy,”, although the interviewee states that the result has not met their 
expectations. Whereas the Nanjing centre has been started due to presentence of regional actors, 
being universities and colleges, as well as ICT2’s biggest manufacturing unit. According to the 
interviewee in China 
“the advantages of establishing research and development centers in different areas: Attract 
high-end talents in different regions; make the cooperation of different regions come true.” 
The interviewee with the Operation Development Director of ICT2 in China also regards the large 
pool of skilled people coming from various Chinese universities as a main reason for locating the 
R&D sites in this country. However, in his view there are not many differences between the 
Chinese market and markets in rest of the world. In his words: “Our market strategy is to provide 
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global solutions, and solve problems in terms of network smooth and call quality, whether what we 
face is high-end markets or low-end markets”.  
The division of labor in terms of innovation between the HQ and the subsidiary is better explained 
by the CEO of Ericsson in Sweden. He indicates that “For the activities related to Radio based 
station important are the innovations that are sustained in Sweden, Canada and China but Sweden 
does mainly core innovation while in China the activities are mainly related to the implementation 
of idea. The Chinese subsidiary can be relevant, for example, for incremental innovation (e.g. 
reducing cost and adapting the product to the specific profile of Chinese operators). But some of 
those innovations also have a global effect. An example of incremental innovation with a ‘global’ 
effect is the production of a play station adapted to the local context; this idea is starting now to be 
spread worldwide”. 
This possibility of the subsidiaries to develop solutions potentially useful for the entire corporation 
puts an additional emphasis on the competences in the subsidiaries. There are not merely adapting 
the products to the local market, but developing products or services (sometimes brand new) that 
are potentially useful for the entire corporation.  
In this respect, each of the largest R&D sites of ICT2 sites has specialized in a particular knowledge 
domain. For example, the site in the Silicon Valley (USA) has the R&D site for radio products, 
India is strong in IT which is related to ICT2 Internet Protocol (IP) business. With respect to the 
differences between the Indian and Chinese R&D sites, our interviewee indicated that although 
Indian can be regarded as strong within the IT area the Chinese have a broader range of domain 
competences in many different areas and thus conduct research for different business in ICT2. So 
R&D in India is not narrower than in China because the Indian market demands fewer or less 
sophisticated products, but because they don’t have all the requisite competences. Especially since 
ICT2 as a group benefits from what goes on in its Chinese operation in that it generates knowledge 
and equipment for global markets, competences rather than market proximity seem to matter more. 
So, it is the breadth and depth of skills available in China what makes the Chinese site a more 
interesting location for R&D for ICT2 than India.  
Although the person interviewed in the HQ in ICT2 does not refer explicitly to the activities of 
ICT2 in South Africa, the interviews done by GIBS may provide some insights. A CEO of ICT2 in 
Sub-Saharan Africa, refers to their continuous travels to the HQ in Europe and rest of Africa. He 
considers that the broader pool of skilled people in SA as well as the presence of the HQ of 
multinational companies in Johanesbourg are a main reason ICT2 to locate in SA in comparison to 
other African countries. The presence of other MNCs would attract more multinationals which 
results in reduction of costs although it raises the competition for attracting highly skilled workers.  
He emphasises the importance of finding locally speaking skilled people that also have the ability of 
speaking the local languages he states that “as more and more people get into the mobile arena with 
handsets and so on, the local languages become more important”. Therefore in order to penetrate 
the whole Africa it is a necessity to have skilled people from African regions. He indicates that even 
though the HQ have the knowledge on networks they need to have a better understanding of the 
local consumers.  
The Commercial Management of ICT2 in Subsaharan Africa also talks about reasons for choosing 
India and China as the R&D sites and he mainly refers to the issue of a large pool of skilled labour 
at a reasonable price. In his words: 
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 “R&D price is still quite high and to do it we have to look at the centre that provides 
engineering expertise and efficiency. And also at a very low cost. And India and China provides 
those fundamentals”.  
Further on he refers to the fact that access to Indian or Chinese market is also another incentive for 
starting and R&D site in those locations, that in case of China the products can also be supplied at a 
global level, thus confirming what the interviewee in the HQ said. He also explains the reasons 
behind a lack of R&D site in SA which is related to size of market (smaller than that of China and 
India for example) and the lack of skilled labor or specific expertise in certain competences (like the 
sites in Ireland or Hungary which are justified not because of the size of their markets but because 
their competences). He emphasizes the lack of engineers as a main hindrance for ICT2 in SA. The 
laws in SA are also regarded as another barrier for recruiting experts. He also refers to the Nigerian 
office and the fact that the lack of local experts makes it inevitable to bring expertise from outside 
or have training for the local skilled people.  
The interviews held in Sweden (HQ of ICT2), China and South Africa point out to a kind of ranking 
of offshoring sites in ICT2. Core R&D seems to be conducted barely in three sites worldwide in 
Sweden, USA and China. These centers provide complex R&D solutions for the different business 
and for the entire corporation which require a combination of a wide arrange of skills. A second tier 
of centers are those that provide very specific competences in certain domain, like for example the 
R&D center in Bangalore which provides very deep expertise in software. They are also global, in 
the sense that they provide solutions also to the entire company, but only on specific domains. A 
final tier of centers are those that conduct mainly development for the local markets. Finally, there 
are locations in which there are not yet any R&D center, but only production and sales, with small 
adaptations to local markets. The site in South Africa falls into this last category. 
 
3.3 Competence management in the global corporation 
Our interviewee indicates that each of the subsidiaries have different challenges in terms of HR 
Management: a country like India has problems with retaining the employees whereas China has the 
opposite problem as only 3% of the local labor tend to move to other companies.  
In ICT2 decisions for tackling new technological ideas are based on two dimensions which are the 
competences at ICT2 (how good they are) and strategic importance. The interviewee describes the 
process using a graphic that plots the strategic importance of the product to be developed and the 
internal competences. 
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When dealing with a new technology (A), ICT2 employees and external experts are used for 
learning how to develop the core technology, but it will be the ICT2 staff (which could be from any 
site in developed or developing countries) that will reach the high level of competences (B). 
However as the competences are built within the company others [competitors] would also be on 
the way to acquiring the specific competences. Therefore time plays the key role on staying or 
leaving an area. The ideal situation is to have built the competences sufficiently fast to be able to 
stay in the strategically high zone for a while. Once the strategic importance becomes low (C) the 
technology will be outsourced to third firms in, for example, emerging economies that have gained 
a high level of competences while the ICT2 experts will be moved to a new area (a prevention for 
firing the experts, although some would prefer to stay and follow the outsourcing of the 
technology). The map illustrates the explained procedure.  
Regarding (C) it should be noted that ICT2 has a explicit mobility policy for transferring the 
knowledge within the company. ICT2 promotes strongly the geographical mobility of the R&D 
employees, who are encouraged to spend a couple of years in one of the subsidiaries. This is not un-
problematic, as one of the South African interviewees indicates.  
Vinny Perumal (Strategic Business Adviser for the Vice-President, ICT2 Sub Saharan Africa) 
explains that having expat employees is very expensive and this is one of the main reason for 
reducing them in SA. He emphasizes the policy of ICT2 for its staff not remaining in on site for 
more than two years. He states that this is a risky business because although the employee learns a 
lot in the new location, he/she runs the risk of not being able to find his/her job back when the two 
year mobility has finished. The reason for having a two years period is stated as “they move people 
around so you grow in terms of not getting bored, in terms of your career.” During this period the 
expats also train the local people, which has also been the case in SA and makes it possible for local 
people to take over the jobs. This policy of mobility is used both to upgrade competences when 
local competences are below what ICT2 commands elsewhere but also to transfer “ICT2 way of 
doing things”, the culture and procedures of the organization.  
100% ICT2 
ICT2 & experts 
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The CEO of ICT2 in Sub-Saharan Africa refers to the fact that the senior management team is not 
situated only in one country and they are required to move to different counties. This is seen as a 
policy toward broadening the future outlook on ICT2 in Africa. He states that  
 “the policy is because Africa is so diverse that it is difficult to run the company in such a 
vast changing business arena, if all the people are based in one location. because so much changes 
so quickly, you really have to be on the ground and spreading us around our management decisions 
are better informed because we don’t have just the SA perspective we have a broader outlook.”.  
Pre-development activities are the core of ICT2’s coordination between the headquarter and 
subsidiaries. In this company, if an idea is small and incremental like changing the design of a 
product then the decisions on how to proceed with the production is made at a local level by the 
expert committees. This may take place at any subsidiary. However the larger and more radical 
technological ideas should be sent to the product council in Sweden where the product development 
decisions will be made and special funds will be allocated to the subsidiary. As stated by the vice-
president R&D (HQ, Sweden): “we find predevelopment globally” 
South Africa is a good example of how a subsidiary proceeds when they do not have an R&D lab. 
The Commercial Management of ICT2 in Subsaharan Africa explains that depending on the type of 
problem, there are different reporting approaches. The problems are send to Sweden, however if a 
technical problem exist within the network they will interact with sites that are having “daylights” 
at the local time. This system which is known as “sun concept” will make it possible to find 
solutions to the problems 24 hours a day. Different sites are the “problem” repositories that at the 
end of the day will send the issues to the R&D sites.  
 
 
4. Conclusions 
The case of ICT2 clearly illustrates that there is not one single reason why a company decides to 
locate an R&D lab in a certain country. It is a combination of factors that include firm strategy, 
environmental conditions and the characteristics of the potential locations in terms of markets and 
skill supply.  
In terms of the strategy, ICT2 decided to respond to the increasing technological complexity of their 
IT solutions as well as to the need to reduce costs (due to the crises) by reducing the number of 
world R&D sites while increasing the individual size of the remaining ones. That is, instead of 
having a wide network of R&D centres worldwide, the company decided to concentrate in a limited 
number of sites. The selection of the sites seems to respond to a double strategy: some of the sites 
has been selected because they have excel in very specific competences (like Bangalore in India or 
Ireland) while some others are a combination of the willingness to position themselves in a larger 
market (also in India) while accessing a broader base of domain competences (Beijing).  
In terms of the environment one can identify the decline in the number of graduates in tertiary 
education in Sweden, the increasing technological complexity (related to their strategy to enlarge 
the remaining R&D sites) and the higher costs of research as the drivers for the strategy of ICT2 to 
locate one of their most important R&D sites outside Sweden, in particular in China.  
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With regards to the environment, it is important to make a clear distinction between the decline in 
the number of graduates in Sweden and the opening of R&D sites somewhere else in the world, as 
the new sites are not a substitute of the R&D center in Stockholm- so, one cannot say that it is the 
scarcity of graduates in Sweden what has encouraged ICT2 to open a site in China. It is the 
combination of the decision to concentrate in few R&D sites, the access to a very large market as 
well as the availability of competences in a variety of domains that has made Beijing a more 
attractive location for a world R&D site than, for example, South Africa. 
This leads to the third factor, the characteristics of the host location. The most important driver is 
still the market, that is, being close to an important market for the company. Currently India is the 
second largest market of ICT2, while China is one of the fastest growing ones and one considered 
strategic by ICT2. Second, the access to competences is an important factor, that is, the availability 
of a large pool of qualified human capital in an array of domains needed to provide 
technologically complex solutions to clients. In fact, competences in the subsidiaries are so 
important for ICT2 that subsidiaries playa double role: the adapt existing products to the local 
markets but they also develop new solutions (in terms of products and services) that can be further 
developed for global markets. It seems that between China, India and South Africa, only China 
fulfils this criterion as India is considered by our interviewee as specialized in a narrow set of 
competence (mainly regarding software development). 
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1. Introduction 
The liberalisation of markets and the globalisation that the world has witnessed in the course of the 
recent decades, has made the movement of capital and goods on and between different continents 
easier than ever before. The greater size of the market allows in-depth specialisation which is the 
key enabler of productivity growth. Specialisation brings also about the increasing fragmentation 
and delocalisation of various economic activities that are part of a value chain of any specific 
product or service. 
Indeed, the total world trade of merchandise and commercial services has increased from 4,230 
billion USD in 1990 to 19,900 billion USD in 2008 (in current prices) (WTO 2009). Proportionally, 
the volume of trade of manufactured intermediate goods increased between 1988 and 2006 from 
2,018 billion USD to 9,580 billion USD (in constant prices). Furthermore, it appears that the 
electronics industry has benefited remarkably from the ongoing trend of globalisation, as the share 
of electronics has increased from 8.1% to 17.4% of the total trade of manufactured intermediate 
goods (Cattaneo et al 2010: 248). 
For a long time, globalisation was primarily about off-shoring the production or customer care 
activities to lower cost locations. However, it has become increasingly apparent since the turn of the 
century that it is not only the more cost-sensitive production tasks but also the R&D and design of 
the new products and services that get increasingly relocated from developed to developing 
countries (Cattaneo et al 2010). One can therefore argue that we are witnessing the transformation 
of the global production networks into the global innovation networks (GIN), where not only the 
production but also innovation takes place on the global scale (INGINEUS). As companies and 
regions specialise in different fragments of GINs, we expect them to require different competences 
and resources. Prior to assessing the impact of GINs in the EU, we need to understand the general 
industry dynamics, company strategies that determine their activities, and the competences 
involved. 
In this paper we focus on the electronics industry, and more specifically on the production of 
telecommunications systems, which is characterised both by very rapid growth of the global trade 
and very high ratio of R&D investments in the sales revenues (Moncada-Paternò-Castello et al 
2010). More specifically, we analyse the distinctly different development paths of the three major 
telecommunications systems producers in the Nordic countries: ICT2, ICT3 and ICT4. ICT2 was 
established in 1876, and has been a well-known brand name for decades. By contrast, ICT3 grew 
from a small company into a global multinational corporation in less than a decade only in the 
1990s. As a global company, ICT4 is still less than ten years old, but it facilitates today more 
international calls than any other telecommunications operator on the planet. 
The evolution of the technologies and the market demand, as well as the competition situation in the 
industry and the particular location based advantages, are all important factors that determine the 
behaviour of these specific companies. Therefore, we start the analysis by presenting a short 
overview of the general industry dynamics in the telecommunications equipment manufacturing. 
Subsequently, we briefly summarise the corporate history of the three case study firms – ICT2, 
ICT3 and ICT4 – in relation to Estonia as the host economy. The aim will be to establish the 
interplay between the broader industry dynamics, corporate strategy and location choice. In other 
words, we are interested in the different push and pull factors that have led to the relocation of 
specific activities to Estonia or away from Estonia.  
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This way, we set the stage for analysing the role of capability building as one of the crucial factors 
in determining the possibilities for moving from the relatively simpler manufacturing or service 
functions to the more knowledge intensive and value added R&D and product development 
activities. The subsequent chapters of this paper deal with capability building that has taken place 
on the level of the public education and R&D systems and on the company level in the case study 
firms. Finally, we discuss catching-up strategies for latecomers in a modern R&D intensive 
industry, such as ICTs and electronics. 
 
 
2. Recent developments in the industry 
 
2.1. The global telecommunications equipment production 
In the period of 1990-2000s, with the advent of the Global System for Mobile Communications 
(GSM) standard and the broad take-up of the mobile telephony services by consumers, the Nordic 
telecommunications equipment manufacturers became the global market leaders both in the 
manufacturing of the mobile telephones and the related network equipment. The United States and 
Japan were developing competing standards which had internationally less success than the 
European GSM standard.  
Nokia had 31% and Ericsson 10% of the mobile phone handsets market in 2000. Motorola, as the 
closest competitor, had 15% of the market in the same year. When Nokia was the leader in the 
manufacturing of the handsets, then Ericsson had a remarkable 30% and Nokia 10% of the mobile 
telecommunications infrastructure equipment market. Motorola had 13%, Lucent 11% and Nortel 
9% of the infrastructure equipment market in 1999. (Rouvinen and Ylä-Anttila 2003, Porter & 
Sölvell 2006: 13). 
In order to properly understand the sources of the Nordic competitive strengths in the mobile 
communications industry, one should consider the respective investments and the evolution of the 
mobile telecommunications in the Nordic countries at least since 1970-1980s. The various elements 
of the value chain of the mobile telephony industry (Figure 1) were fairly closely located in the 
Nordic countries even in the 1990s. In the following decade, however, both the competition 
situation and the geography changed notably in this industry. 
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Figure 1: Mobile telephony value chain 
 
Source: Sölvell & Porter 2006. 
 
The initial saturation of the market, Nasdaq crash and the emergence of the next generation (3G) 
mobile telephony standards1 led to a significant restructuring of the industry in the early 2000s. For 
example, ICT2 who was the market leader in network infrastructures, but had in handsets a weaker 
market position merged its handsets business with Sony’s. Siemens merged, for similar reasons, its 
network infrastructures business with Nokia, and sold its handsets business all together to the 
Taiwanese BenQ.  
Although the market share of the Asian producers was negligible in the turn of the century, various 
emerging market actors, such as Samsung, LG (both Korea), Huawei (China), and others have been 
rapidly building up their product development and manufacturing capabilities. Furthermore, various 
integrated microchips and ready-made integrated platforms that are instrumental for developing 
mobile telephones, have became readily available from the various semiconductor manufacturers, 
such as Qualcomm, Infineon, ST-Ericsson, MediaTek. Thereby, from the technological point of 
view the mobile telephone market has become much easier to enter for the new actors. What 
matters the most in the low end of this market, is the market power and access to the end customers 
at large emerging markets, such as South-East Asia and Africa. 
In the 1990s, the product development and manufacturing were, although dependent on the 
independent suppliers of microelectronics components, fairly closely connected in Western Europe 
                                                     
1
 At the time of the development of the original GSM standards, no one could properly estimate the future importance of 
the mobile data communications. Therefore, the original GSM standard foresaw only the possibilities for a very limited 
(9600 bps) speed of data communications. The shift from the GSM (2G) mobile telephony systems to the 2.5G (EDGE), 
3G and the forthcoming 4G networks is, therefore, foremost about the increasing of the bandwidth that could be made 
available for the mobile data communications. 
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and in the United States. However, with the saturation of the European and other developed country 
markets, Asia became both the greatest growing market and the largest manufacturing base. The 
mobile telephony production value chain have become truly globalised in the course of the last 
decade. 
For example, the Apple’s iPhone, which is one of the today’s most eye-catching electronics 
products, is actually manufactured by the Taiwanese Hon Hai Precision Industry Co Ltd, while the 
various microelectronics components are sourced from different companies and manufacturing 
plants across the globe. Thus, the various parts of the Apple iPhone related global innovation and 
production networks are indeed dispersed across the globe. The iPhone 4 display, application 
processor and memory come from LG and Samsung in Korea, radio chips come from Broadcom 
and Intel in the U.S., and Infeon in Germany, and the various smaller components come from 
elsewhere (iSuppli 2010).  
Sony Ericsson’s mobile telephones build similarly on the standard components that have been 
designed by the various major microelectronics firms, such as Qualcomm, Texas Instruments in the 
U.S., Avago in Singapore, etc. (Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2: Schematic Sony Ericsson Xperia X1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: iFixit 2010. 
 
Both the major brand names in the telecommunications equipment manufacturing, but also their 
component providers operate on global basis. Their headquarters, marketing, R&D and product 
development, manufacturing, services and support activities, etc., are located in different parts of 
the world. 
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The fact that the various semiconductor components and ready-made modules of the mobile 
telephones are increasingly readily available to anyone and the whole production chain has become 
truly global has shifted the very nature of the market competition in this industry in recent decades. 
The market competition in the telecommunications equipment manufacturing is not about mastering 
the development and production of the individual products any more, but about development and 
commanding the whole ecosystems of different organisations who are involved in the whole 
product life cycle from R&D and product development to manufacturing, sales and customer care 
(Figure 3). 
 
Figure 3: Innovation networks and ecosystems 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Ollila 2011. 
Apple has recently managed to control its whole global innovation and production network in a way 
no other mobile phone manufacturer has been able to follow. This together with the superior 
product design and the specialisation in the upper end of the market allows Apple to reap unrivalled 
economic benefits.2 Although Apple sells only 4% of all mobile telephones, it collects a remarkable 
50% of the total profits of the mobile handset industry. By contrast, the former market leader Nokia 
has been recently underperforming. Nokia sells still 32% of all handsets, but it has been 
increasingly competing in the overcrowded lower end of the market, and this has allowed it to 
benefit from only 15% of the industry profits (Figure 4). 
 
                                                     
2
 The various iPhone components cost only $187.5 and the assembly only $6.5 of the $600 iPhone 4 sales price (iSuppli 
2010). 
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Figure 4: Earnings of the major mobile telephone producers. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: 
Source: Asymco 2010. 
 
Nokia’s and Sony Ericsson’s recent failure to capitalise on the smartphone market is largely due to 
the failure of the Symbian operating system that (OS) Nokia and Sony-Ericsson have been 
developing jointly with some other manufacturers. Unfortunately, the Symbian consortium has been 
never able to establish a consistent OS that would allow for the development of applications that run 
without modifications on a myriad of different handsets produced by Nokia, Sony Ericsson and 
others. The development and maintenance of applications that run on multiple similar but mutually 
incompatible platforms is costly. It is also confusing for the end users to figure out what specific 
version of the software they should acquire. As a result, the Symbian mobile applications market 
never took off, and Apple has overtaken the market leadership with its innovative touch-screen user 
interfaces and iTunes App Store, which everyone else now attempts to copy.  
The competition for the establishment of a de facto standard of the mobile operating system is, 
however, still ongoing. Google, another newcomer at the mobile telephony market, is currently 
Apple’s fastest growing and strongest contender in the fierce competition for establishment of a 
dominant software platform. Sony Ericsson has started a partnership with Google and introduced its 
first Android powered smartphone in the spring of 2010. On 11 February 2011, Nokia announced a 
new software partnership with Microsoft, another ailing giant that has failed to establish its software 
stronghold in the mobile telephone industry (Bloomberg 2011)3. 
The mobile telephone network equipment market is another completely different market segment 
for the telecommunications equipment manufacturing industry, which has a rather different 
competition and demand dynamics as compared to the market for handsets.  
                                                     
3
 Both Apple and Google have also taken serious steps at extending their iOS and Android platforms beyond mobile 
telephones to other devices such as, e.g., the tablet computers and flat screen TVs, and have come up with the Apple TV 
and Google TV systems respectively. 
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The infrastructure equipment market contracted in 2009-2010, as the operators cut spending during 
the recession and aggressive Chinese vendors drove down the prices. In this market segment, ICT2 
continues to be the market leader with 33.6% of the market in Q3 2010, while the Chinese Huawei 
(20.6%) has performed recently slightly better than Nokia Siemens Networks (19.8%). The fourth 
largest player, the U.S. based Alcatel-Lucent had 16.2% of the market (Reuters 2010).  
What makes this market different is that it is not the consumers but the network operators who are 
the equipment manufacturer’s clients. The number of individual units sold to this market is much 
smaller than the number of mobile telephones sold, and the variety of consumer preferences and the 
different models of the products is also much more limited here. Nonetheless, the market for the 
mobile telecommunications network equipment continues to be anything but a fully harmonised 
global market that relies on universally adopted global standards.  
The developed countries continue to be the main market both for the high-end smartphones and for 
the 4G (Long-Term Evolution, LTE) infrastructure equipment, while the continued rolling-out of 
the simpler telephones, and the 2G and 3G network infrastructure will drive the growth at the 
developing markets4. Some of the large developing nations, e.g. China, are also moving very fast to 
the 4G technologies. Furthermore, they continue to compete with the major developed nations for 
the standardisation of their particular specifications of the 4G networks and protocols.  
The different market dynamics and smaller production volumes imply, in turn, different location 
choices for the development and manufacturing of the infrastructure equipment as compared to the 
handsets. 
 
2.2. The importance of the telecommunications equipment industry for Estonia and the 
Nordic countries 
ICT sector is one of the most knowledge and R&D intensive industries both globally and in the 
Baltic Sea Region. However, both the size and the knowledge intensity of the ICT sector vary 
substantially both across the different ICT sub-sectors in the different countries in the region. The 
share of the ICT sector in the GDP is in Finland and Sweden among the highest in Europe. This is 
largely due to the major contribution of the manufacturing industry, in particular the manufacturing 
of telecommunications equipment. The presence of a strong ICT manufacturing sector is indeed 
what distinguishes the Nordic countries from the majority of the other European economies, where 
the ICT sector accounts only for 3-4% of the GDP (Figure 5).  
 
                                                     
4 The transition from 2G to 3G to 4G networks is primarily about allowing for a major increase in the data 
communications bandwidths in the mobile telephone networks. 
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Figure 5: The ratio of the ICT sector value added to the GDP in 2005 
 
Source: Turlea et al 2009: 46. 
 
Finland has a particularly strong specialisation in the manufacturing of the telecommunications 
equipment. In fact, Nokia’s remarkable success in the last decades has been clearly visible in the 
Finnish economy, especially when considering its small size. Nokia contributed more than 2% of 
the Finnish GDP growth in 2000. More recently, however, the consolidation of the industry and the 
rise of the U.S. and Asia based competitors has changed the situation substantially. Nokia’s 
contribution to the economic growth in Finland was negative even during the global crisis in 2008-
2009 (Ali-Yrkkö 2010: 12). In contrast, Sweden’s industry is much more diversified which makes it 
much less dependent on particular large companies such as ICT2, or other multinationals that are 
headquartered in Sweden. 
The important role of the telecommunications equipment manufacturing in Finland and Sweden is 
even more visible in the export figures. Finland’s and Sweden’s exports of goods doubled between 
the 1995 and 2009. Estonia’s exports grew in this period even more rapidly. While this is the case, 
it can be observed that the export of telecommunications equipment in all three countries clearly hit 
the peak around the turn of the century (Figure 6).  
This has, once again, to do with Nokia in case of Finland, and ICT2 in Sweden. Estonia’s exports in 
the telecommunications equipment have also predominantly to do with the two above-mentioned 
companies. Their manufacturing service provider ICT3 has been for more than a decade responsible 
for the vast majority of imports and exports of telecommunications equipment to and from Estonia 
(Tiits & Jüriado 2006). 
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Figure 6: The share of the telecommunications equipment in the total exports of goods 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations, ComExt 2011. 
 
In order to shed some light on the location decisions both for the R&D and manufacturing activities 
of the major players in the telecommunications equipment manufacturing, we present first the cases 
of ICT2 and ICT3. Thereafter, we contrast these with ICT4, a disruptive software firm that has 
become the largest provider of international calls in less than half a decade. In addition, it has 
challenged the whole business model of the established telecommunications industry. ICT2 and 
ICT3 located primarily their manufacturing activities into Estonia, while Estonia has been since the 
very beginning the location of ICT4’s main engineering centre. 
Both these firms’ motivations for operating in Estonia and their intra-firm capability building 
activities are, as seen in the following chapters, also very different. The capability building that does 
or does not take place within the firms and their location choice depends, however, also strongly on 
the success of the public education and R&D systems in making the qualified workforce available 
to the firms. We review, therefore, prior to discussing the case study firms briefly the recent supply 
of the ICT workforce at the various qualification levels in Estonia. 
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3. Competence building on the national level in Estonia 
 
3.1. The availability of R&D personnel 
The number of researchers and engineers remains, both in absolute terms and as a ratio to the 
employment, lower than that of the Nordic countries. While Estonia’s public sector R&D efforts 
remain, both in terms of  personnel and investments, comparable to the European Union average,  
industrial R&D lags behind. 
The Estonia’s total R&D personnel count was close to 9900 persons (5500 in full-time equivalent) 
in 2009. This includes 7500 researchers and engineers (4300 researchers and engineers in full-time 
equivalent), while the rest are technicians and supporting staff (Statistics Estonia 2011). This is, in 
absolute terms, a relatively small number of researchers that is comparable to a single research lab 
of a major multinational corporation.  
The fact that the full-time equivalent of the R&D personnel varies in Estonia significantly from the 
total number of R&D personnel is explained by two reasons. About one half of the R&D personnel 
in Estonia is employed in the higher education sector, whereas the majority of the R&D personnel 
acts there half of the time as researcher and half of the time as teaching staff. Similarly, in the 
enterprise sector, most of the R&D staff undertakes various other tasks besides R&D activities (e.g. 
product development, market research) rather than being involved in pure R&D. 
Statistics Estonia provides us with no estimation of the number of ICT researchers in the public 
sector, but the Estonian Research Portal which is the official interface for national R&D funding 
applications, lists altogether 410 persons who are active in the field of computer science as their 
field of research. However, only 162 of them have at least one publication referred in ISI Web of 
Science, and only 127 of them have a PhD degree.5  
By the same token, Lipmaa has identified 131 Estonian computer scientists that have at least one 
citation of their research paper.6 Based on this, we estimate that in Estonian public sector there are 
no more than 150 reasonably active and productive computer scientists. 
The Estonian business enterprise sector had about 3100 R&D personnel (2900 in full-time 
equivalent) in 2009. The above included 189 persons (118 in FTE) of R&D staff who were in the 
manufacturing of electric and optical equipment and 712 (572 in FTE) R&D staff who were 
involved in computer related activities. Thus, Estonian ICT enterprises had a R&D staff of no more 
than 1,000 (700 in FTE) in 2009 (Statistics Estonia 2011). Furthermore, the industrial ICT R&D 
personnel is also very concentrated in terms of the number of the enterprises. A tiny number of 
relatively larger R&D and product development intensive ICT firms such as ICT4, Playtech and 
Cybernetica are most likely to employ vast majority of the above-mentioned R&D staff. 
Given the above, Estonia’s R&D investments remain also significantly lower than those of Finland 
or Sweden, for example. Estonia’s gross R&D expenditure (GERD) was 1.4% of GDP in 2009 
(1.3% of GDP in 2008), while Sweden’s and Finland’s GERD continues to be more than 3% of 
                                                     
5
 Estonian Research Portal that is for public sector institutions the interface to national R&D funding. See: 
http://www.etis.ee. 
6
 Helger Lipmaa, data last modified 1 July 2009, http://research.cyber.ee/~lipmaa/cites/php/estcit.php. 
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GDP. Comparatively speaking, Estonia is lagging behind primarily due to the smaller number of 
R&D personnel in the industrial sector, which has in turn to do with the structure of the industry 
itself.  
Estonia does not possess, similarly to most of the newer EU member states, a highly R&D intensive 
ICT and electronics industry. Foreign investment enterprises, which are responsible for the vast 
majority of electronics exports, have located only relatively less demanding production functions 
here. Furthermore, Estonia does not have a strong biotechnology, pharmaceutical or automotive 
industry. Yet, the above-mentioned industries are responsible for the vast majority of the global 
industrial R&D investments (Moncada-Paternò-Castello et al 2010). 
 
3.2. The supply of the ICT sector labour force  
There are about 20 different vocational schools in Estonia that offer education in the fields of 
computer sciences and/or in the electronics and automation. In some schools a modest number of 
students (15-20 people) is admitted in the above-mentioned ICT programmes, while the larger 
schools admit to the ICT studies up to 300-500 new students annually. This raises some questions 
about the effectiveness and efficiency of the organisation of the vocational education system, 
especially when one compares the admittance numbers with the number of people graduating. 
The number of people graduating from vocational education has decreased in Estonia by 
approximately 20% in the last decade. The decrease in the number of graduates has been even faster 
in the computer sciences, while there has been at least twofold increase in the graduation rate in the 
field of electronics and automatics (Figure 7). 
 
Figure 7: Graduation from the ICT vocational education in Estonia 
 
Note: On the both scales the number of graduated students is indicated. 
Source: Estonian Ministry of Education and Research 2011. 
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Unfortunately, the ICT related vocational education system is not very efficiently organized in 
Estonia. Each year an average of 392 computer sciences and 362 electronics and automatics 
students discontinue their studies (based on the statistics from the years 2005-2010). In other words, 
in the ICT fields roughly every second student stopped with their studies. 
The prospective new students have given higher education very strong preference over vocational 
education. This is clearly visible in the increase of the admittance to the higher education in general, 
as well as to the ICT related higher education in particular. The share of the computer sciences 
increased from 3% to 7% among the newly admitted students in the higher education in the years 
1997-2002, and has remained stable since then (Statistics Estonia 2011). A similar increase in the 
importance of the computer science is also visible in the number of people graduating from higher 
education (Figure 8). 
 
Figure 8: Graduation from the ICT higher education in Estonia 
 
Note: The above data refers to the graduation in the computer sciences. 
Source: Statistics Estonia, 2011. 
 
The higher education system suffers, however, similarly to the vocational education, from the 
delays in studies and a very high student dropout rate. About half of the students did not complete 
their studies in computer sciences in a timely manner in Estonia in the recent years. The high 
demand for work force, the need to work in order to fund the studies, and the modest quality of 
some of the study programmes are all likely to contribute to the high discontinuation frequency of 
the studies. 
Another issue is that ICT curricula stem from traditional branches of study and science – on one 
hand from physics and engineering and on the other hand from mathematics and informatics – even 
though the needs of the present-day industry presume a synthesis of both areas and more. Modern 
ICT companies do not just produce, install and maintain ICT tools and systems. They have to be in 
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touch with business systems in a particular application area and to able to see ICT tools in this 
context. Therefore, in addition to the engineering and informatics background they also need to be 
ready for an interdisciplinary approach, where the emphasis is on the applications solving rather 
than the ICTs per se. Even though traditional curricula that focus on engineering and informatics are 
necessary, there is also a need for curricula that integrate both areas and are interdisciplinary (Figure 9).  
 
Figure 9: The profile of ICT industry’s needs for Degree Qualifications 
 
Source: Career Space and International Co-operation Europe Ltd 2001  
 
The various studies on Estonian ICT education conclude that a lack of skilled labour is the main 
factor that hinders the development of local companies, whereas skilled labour would allow them to 
rapidly move ahead in areas where they already have a certain competence for development 
activities. Important shortcomings that were brought out are insufficient specialisation and in 
certain areas also weak basic education (e.g. system analysis). The problem can be summarised as 
follows: people who have acquired higher education need a couple of months or even up to a year 
before they meet the requirements and interests of the companies. At the same time, the knowledge 
and skill base of experienced people is relatively low, making it a starting point from which it is 
hard to strongly and rapidly move towards R&D activities (Kattel and Kalvet 2006). 
The Estonian ICT sector, which employed all together 15565 persons in 2010, has according to a 
recent study currently about 1700 vacancies, and there is a need for about 4200 additional 
bachelor’s or master’s level employees within the next three years (ITL 2011). The current supply 
of the highly qualified labour is not, unfortunately, able to meet such a demand. The demographic 
trends in Estonia contribute to the challenges in the supply of qualified labour even further. The 
new students to be admitted to the ICT higher education will decline in Estonia twofold between the 
years 2008-2015 (Figure 10). 
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Figure 10: Number of first year IT students admitted 
 
Source: Praxis, authors’ calculations. 
 
Overall, as long as the supply of the research and engineering personnel for the ICTs and the other 
science intensive industries remains insufficient, upgrading to the more R&D intensive activities 
remains constrained at the enterprise level and Estonia’s total business R&D investment is also 
bound to remain significantly lower than that of Finland or Sweden. 
 
 
4. Firms’ motivation for operating in and from Estonia 
4.1. Established major brand name: the case of ICT2 
ICT2 was founded in 1876 as a telegraph repair shop. In the early 20th century, ICT2 was a rapidly 
growing international company that was very interested in the rapidly growing markets of the 
eastern shores of the Baltic Sea. The Swedish company even considered moving its headquarters to 
St. Petersburg, Russia. The Bolshevik Revolution put an end to this plan in 1917. Some of ICT2’s 
leading engineers moved from the St. Petersburg factory to Tartu, Estonia and contributed to the 
development of the local telephone factory (Tartu Telefonivabrik). Eventually, this Estonian 
company became ICT2’s most important partner in Eastern Europe, as it started to produce 
telephones under a licence from ICT2 and under the ICT2 brand name (Högselius 2005:56). World 
War II and the resulting occupation of Estonia by the Soviet Union brought an end to this business 
relationship. 
ICT2 was one of the pioneers of the Nordic Mobile Telephone (NMT) and GSM telephone systems 
in the 1980–1990s, when two Nordic firms were the global market leaders in manufacturing mobile 
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telecommunications equipment. ICT2 continued to offer exchanges and other infrastructure 
equipment for fixed telecommunications and special radio communications networks.  
These were the main products ICT2 was interested in finding new markets for, when Estonia had 
restored its independence in the early 1990s. Shortly after independence Swedish Telia and Finnish 
Sonera became shareholders of the dominant fixed telephony company Estonian Telecom, along 
with the government of Estonia. Soon very rapid development of the new digital communications 
networks started, and ICT2 became an important vendor of new technologies in the first major 
deals, including digital telephone exchanges for the fixed telephony network and slightly later also 
the NMT mobile telephony network. 
As discussed above, ICT2 handed the manufacturing of mobile telephones over to a dedicated 
company – a joint venture between it and another large global player  – when the consolidation of 
the industry started in the 2000s. Furthermore, an ICT2 subsidiary company also started to sell 
mobile telephone components and kits to third parties. ICT2 itself continues, however, to be the 
market leader for the manufacture of mobile telephone network equipment. This is also visible in 
the specialisation of its Estonian subsidiary. 
ICT2 Estonia started as a local representative and a wholesale organisation that caters for the needs 
of local clients in Estonia in the early 1990s. In time, in addition to the wholesale of ICT2 
equipment, the share of the various value added services such as network planning and systems 
integration started to increase in sales. For example, ICT2 Estonia started to serve network 
operators in Denmark, Sweden and Japan in the early 2000s.  
Today, ICT2 Estonia provides telephony and data communications systems planning, integration 
and maintenance services to various clients. In recent years, the network maintenance services 
provided to the various network operators in the Baltic States have also gained in importance. The 
logistics unit of ICT2 Estonia serves the other Baltic and Nordic firms within the ICT2 group. For 
2008–2009, about half of the sales revenues were earned from the sales of telecom equipment and 
the other half from the sales of various services. 
In summary, ICT2 Estonia has focused predominantly on sales and service functions in Estonia for 
two decades. ICT2’s R&D and product development activities continue to take place in its major 
corporate development centres outside Estonia. ICT2 Estonia’s activities were primarily upgraded 
in the 1990s and 2000s due to the gradual extension of the services portfolio from basic sales and 
support activities to more knowledge-intensive network infrastructure planning and maintenance 
services as well as support for the development of various value added telephony and Internet 
services.  
Occasionally, some middleware solutions have also been developed for ICT2 mobile telephone 
networks in Estonia. For example, a mobile positioning system was developed for the 112 
emergency services in cooperation with the Estonian GIS firm Regio in the early 2000s. This 
system allows the geographic location of a mobile telephone that has placed an incoming phone call 
to be automatically detected based on the mobile telephone network. Later, Regio started to offer an 
advanced version of this mobile positioning system internationally under the ICT2 brand name. 
Such cooperation with Regio as a local partner has, however, been mostly handled directly from 
Sweden. 
However, the profile of the ICT2 organisation in Estonia changed significantly when ICT2 acquired 
a major share of the ICT3 facility in Tallinn in 2010. ICT2 has had ICT3 as a global manufacturing 
partner for two decades. Even though ICT3 manufactured for ICT2 in Estonia, there was no direct 
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business between the subsidiaries of these two firms in Estonia. With this recent deal, ICT2 took 
over the facilities and personnel that ICT3 used for offering ICT2 electronics manufacturing 
services. For ICT2’s part, this acquisition of the manufacturing operations in Estonia does not seem 
to have been part of a longer-term corporate plan for the expansion of the facilities in Estonia. It 
was rather a chance event that was connected to the restructuring of ICT3’s global network that the 
global economic crisis brought about in 2008–2009. 
The number of ICT2 employees grew considerably with the acquisition and expansion of 
manufacturing activities in Estonia. ICT2 Estonia had about 100 employees in 2007–2008. The 
number of ICT2 Estonia employees increased, however, with the acquisition of the ICT3 plant and 
the transfer of the more than 1200 related personnel to ICT2 at the beginning of 2010. 
Earlier, ICT3 manufactured equipment for the 2G and 3G mobile communications networks as well 
as for the fixed broadband networks in Tallinn for ICT2. After the change of ownership, the 
production of 4G data communications network equipment was launched in Estonia in May 2010. 
This production line achieved full capacity by August 2010. ICT2 exports most of the equipment 
produced in Estonia to various network operators in Europe, North America and Africa, but some of 
it also remains on the local market where TeliaSonera’s local subsidiary EMT continues to be 
ICT2’s local key customer.  
More broadly speaking, the specialisation of the Tallinn plant in ICT2’s global production network 
did not change after the change of ownership. The Tallinn plant continues to provide electronics 
manufacturing services for ICT2, just as it did under ICT3’s ownership. As previously, ICT2’s 
research and product development continues to take place outside Estonia, while the subsidiary in 
Estonia focuses primarily on the organisation of manufacturing, etc. Accordingly, learning by doing 
and manufacturing-related organisational innovation remain the main forms of development. 
ICT2 does not disclose the exact production figures for the Estonian plant, but it is still obvious that 
ICT2’s contribution to Estonia’s foreign trade is massive. According to Veiko Sepp, CEO of ICT2 
Estonia at the time of the interview, ICT2 was responsible for about 10% of Estonia’s exports and 
about 50% of Estonia’s exports to Sweden in Q4 2010. 
 
4.2. Integrated manufacturing service provider: the case of ICT3 
ICT37 was founded as a subsidiary of a Finnish company in 1984, to support the parent 
corporation’s  development and production of electroluminescent displays. However, this business 
did not develop as initially hoped, and some free capacity became available in  the subsidiary 
company. Meanwhile, another large ICT corporation in Finland and ICT2 in Sweden had both 
developed their first Nordic Mobile Telephony (NMT) telephones, the full-scale production of 
which was held back by their small components assembly capacity, and they were looking for 
additional manufacturing expertise. This is how the subsidiary company became an electronics 
manufacturing service (EMS) provider, with the other Finnish ICT corporation and ICT2 as its 
largest customers in the early 1990s (ICT3 2010a). 
                                                     
7
 Hereinafter ‘Elcoteq’ refers to the Elcoteq corporation globally, and ‘Elcoteq Tallinn’ refers to the particular 
subsidiary established in Estonia. 
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In 1990, in preparation for a merger with a third Finnish industrial conglomerate, the parent 
corporation restructured itself and registered its different business operations as separate companies. 
The subsidiary was renamed ICT3 through this process. The new corporation that emerged as the 
result of the merger, did not however consider microelectronics to be its core business, and ICT3 
went through a management buy-out in 1991. This was the beginning of ICT3 as an independent 
enterprise with both the Finnish ICT company and ICT2 as its key customers. 
In the early 1990s, when Swedish and Finnish entrepreneurs were the first to invest in Estonia, 
ICT3 started pilot production in Estonia already in 1992, and formally established a subsidiary in 
Estonia in 1993. This was ICT3's very first subsidiary abroad. Although initially various Asian 
countries had been considered as a potential location, a better alternative was eventually found 
closer to home in Tallinn. 
One of the ICT3 Tallinn's veterans has described the creative destruction that took place in the early 
1990s with the following words: “It was a productive time, the industry had collapsed and the town 
was full of unemployed engineers.” The newly employed engineers were initially sent for training to 
Finland or Sweden. Later on, training was increasingly organised locally in Estonia.8 While the 
existing engineering in Estonia was trained on the latest technologies and production methods, but 
they were no more in charge of the actual product development, where ICT3 itself had no say 
either. 
In 1996, ICT3 Tallinn started to operate as the repair centre for GSM mobile telephones9. Already 
in the following year, volume production of GSM mobile telephones was initiated, and ICT3 
became the very first EMS business that started to ‘box build’ mobile phones for a major brand 
name from start to finish. The fact that ICT2 had subcontracted the whole production of a specific 
model of mobile telephone brought ICT3 to a completely new level of collaboration with its clients. 
Most notably, the Finnish ICT company soon also followed suit. What followed can be 
characterised as a true co-evolution of the major brand names and ICT3 as an EMS that was an 
integral part of their value chain. By the late 1990s, ICT3 was producing mobile handsets in Estonia 
for two market leaders of the time.10 
This was a prosperous time both for the Nordic mobile telephone producers and the EMS 
businesses that were working with them. The European mobile telephony market was booming and 
production and sales volumes went up very rapidly. This is also very vividly reflected in both the 
Nordic and Estonian foreign trade statistics. In Estonia, telecommunication equipment had reached 
up to 20% of the manufactured exports by the turn of the century. In this period, most of the 
production technologies and components were imported and virtually all of the produced goods 
were exported. The share of local content other than labour remained virtually nonexistent. Thence, 
                                                     
8
 When Estonian independence was restored in 1991, its economy was in a poor state. So was the economy of the whole 
former USSR. Therefore, both for political and economic reasons, Estonia began immediately to reorient its economy to 
western markets, which had both greater purchasing power and growth prospects. However, as became evident very 
soon, the majority of the electronics industry that Estonia had inherited was not competitive on western markets, and 
was therefore forced to close down (Tiits 2006). As a result of this, experienced workforce for the electronics industry 
was readily available in Estonia in the early 1990s. 
9
 GSM is widely a used acronym for the Global System for Mobile Communications, originally Groupe Spécial Mobile, 
standard, which is used in digital cellular networks. 
10
 Both Nokia and Ericsson were clients of the Finnish EMS firm Elcoteq already since the mid-1980s; and Elcoteq had 
manufactured mobile telephone circuit boards for Ericsson already for a number of years. 
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not surprisingly, the value added generated in the Estonian electronics industry also remained 
significantly lower than that in traditional industries, e.g., wood processing, etc. (Tiits et al 2006). 
In the late 1990s, ICT3 also started to expand internationally, as increasingly it made sense to locate 
manufacturing activities close to the rapidly growing consumer markets. The need to serve the key 
customers at their new markets was the main driver of ICT3’s very rapid globalisation. To finance 
the expansion, ICT3’s shares were floated on the Helsinki Stock Exchange in 1997.  
First, a new manufacturing site was established in Hungary, and an office was established in the 
United States. An office was also established in Hong Kong for managing the manufacturing 
activities that were located in southern China, etc. In effect, within two short years ICT3 became a 
truly global corporation. By the end of 1999, ICT3’s network of plants covered already more than 
ten countries in the three fastest growing regions of the world: Europe, America and Asia. 
The business model and the modus operandi that were originally adopted in Finland and Estonia 
provided a good starting point, but needed adapting for Hungary, Russia, Germany, Mexico and 
China. ICT3’s Finnish and Estonian business development and engineering staff were therefore 
actively involved in the establishment of the new sites elsewhere in the world, and in training the 
local staff. Also, through these experiences, a well-documented system was established in ICT3 for 
transferring any specific production line from one site to another. As opposed to some other 
multinational corporations, the individual units within ICT3 continue to rely on uniform 
standardised technologies and processes also today. 
The NASDAQ crisis brought about consolidation and global restructuring in the whole ICT and 
electronics industry from 2001 onwards. The large-scale manufacturing of consumer electronics, 
incl. mobile telephones and similar, has shifted increasingly to the low-cost locations close to the 
final markets. For example, ICT2, as the part of streamlining its value chains, moved the 
manufacturing of its mobile telephones from ICT3 Tallinn to St. Petersburg (Russia).  
Also, a number of mergers and acquisitions took place between ICT enterprises. The establishment 
of a new parent company from the joint venture, and the subsequent sale of ICT2’s own mobile 
telephone manufacturing plants to a competitor was, further to the general market downturn, 
another major blow for ICT3 (ICT3 2010a). Despite the above, in Tallinn (and in other sites) the 
manufacturing of ICT2 mobile network equipment and the Finnish ICT company telephones 
continues for the time being. 
Initially, ICT3 engineering centre, which is in charge of prototype testing and new product 
introduction, was located in Finland. In 2000, a new engineering centre was established in Tallinn, 
Estonia. In 2002 one more engineering centre was established in Beijing, China. To strengthen its 
engineering capabilities even further, ICT3 bought the R&D unit of the Finnish mobile telephone 
and telematics company Benefon in 2002 (ICT3 2010a). 
In the 2000s, ICT3 had to adjust to a weaker demand and a general slowdown in the ICT industry. It 
was acknowledged that manufacturing activities alone would not be sufficient for sustaining profit 
margins in the changed market environment. Consequently, ICT3 started to further its own design, 
R&D, engineering and after-sales services. Special New Product Introduction (NPI) centres were 
established within ICT3 to strengthen the co-operation with clients and their design houses in 
testing prototypes and making preparations for actual production. 
Although ICT3 had all the capabilities for designing mobile telephones, and even developed at one 
point in time one handset for ICT2, it did not challenge its main customers in R&D and product 
development, but remained a contract manufacturer. The competition continued to intensify in the 
 D6.1: Research papers on “Fragmentation of GINs and capability building in the automotive, ICT 
and agro-processing industries” -  
“Nordic small countries in the global high-tech value chains: the case of telecommunications 
systems production in Estonia” 
 
 
Page 179 of 240 
EMS business on all fronts in the 2000s. For example, the Finnish company started to source some 
of its printed circuit boards from Foxconn (Hon Hai) and GKI in Asia, and handled the 
manufacturing all together in-house in Brazil. In the mid-2000s, it continued to streamline its 
supplier network, and gave a preference to larger vertically integrated suppliers such as the Foxconn 
and BYD. As a result ICT3 was eventually forced to downsize significantly its handset business 
from this company (Seppälä 2010).  
ICT3 started therefore to capitalise increasingly on its telecommunications equipment 
manufacturing competences by manufacturing, later in the 2000s, to an even broader set of clients. 
Along with this, new plants were also inaugurated in Bangalore (India) and St. Petersburg (Russia) 
in 2005. In the same year ICT3 was reincorporated as a European Company (SE) and the regional 
headquarters was established in Budapest (Hungary) for managing European operations. 
Furthermore, the domicile of the company was transferred to Luxembourg in 2008.  
The recent global financial and economic crisis brought about another restructuring of the ICT3 
global network. During 2009 the factories in Arad (Romania), Richardson (US) and St. Petersburg 
(Russia) were closed down. The factory in Shenzhen was consolidated into the factory in Beijing in 
China. Part of the ICT3 Tallinn plant, which earlier served ICT2, was sold to ICT2. With this 
transaction, some 1 200 employees of ICT3 Tallinn moved also to ICT2 (ICT3 Annual Report 
2009). After this transaction, ICT2 continues to produce 4G (LTE) mobile network equipment in 
Tallinn, for which TeliaSonera in Sweden is one of the most important customers.  
In response to the above, ICT3 has extended its client portfolio and continues to operate its EMS 
business on a global scale (Figure 11). It continues to produce both mobile handsets and 
infrastructure systems. On a global scale,, almost all major telecommunications equipment 
producers, incl. Nokia, Samsung, LG, Motorola, Sony Ericsson, Huawei, etc., continue to be ICT3's 
clients. Further to this, ICT3 has established itself also in the production of flat screen TVs. (ICT3 
2010b) In Europe, the plant located in Hungary is ICT3’s main mass production plant, while ICT3 
Tallinn with its approximately 300 staff continues to cater for smaller niche markets. 
Figure 11: The location of ICT3 sites 
 
Source: Annual Report 2009. 
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Overall, in a global comparison, ICT3 still continues to be a fairly small electronics manufacturing 
service provider. ICT3 revenues were 1500 million euros in 2009 (ICT3 2010b). The revenues of 
Foxconn and Flextronix – the largest contract manufacturing companies in the world – were, 
however, 21 and 15 times larger in the same year. This is why ICT3 continues to focus on the 
technologically and organisationally more demanding small and medium scale manufacturing rather 
than large scale mass production, where the big competitors have an advantage. 
 
4.3. Disruptive telecommunications service: the case of ICT4 
Internet was in the 1970-1980s, when the development of the modern digital telephone systems 
standards began, anything but widespread. At that time, voice communications were the primary 
means of communication, and most data communications ran on dial-up lines at what is by today’s 
standards a very low speed. In a word, the architecture and business models of modern digital 
telecommunications systems were originally built for voice communication that gets billed per 
minute of use.  
The very rapid spread of the Internet and the development of the underlying communications 
technologies has brought about major technological disruptions in the telecommunications industry 
since the 1990s. With broadband Internet access, there is no billing per minute, and international 
communications are virtually free of charge. The above technological change prepared, thereby, the 
ground for a major disruption in the whole telecommunications industry, since it became feasible to 
route otherwise costly telephone calls over the Internet, where international communications are 
virtually free of charge and no traditional billing per minute of use applies.  
This is exactly where the Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) entered the scene from the mid-
1990s. ICT4 is a VoIP software application that allows anyone to talk to anyone else on the Internet 
free of charge. It allows the calls, for a modest fee, also to be routed to the ‘old school’ telephone 
network. ICT4 was founded in 2003 by Swedish and Danish entrepreneurs. ICT4’s software 
development team was from the very beginning located in Tallinn, Estonia, which became 
immediately its largest office in terms of the number of staff.  
The first beta version of ICT4, which was released in August 2003, allowed for computer-to-
computer voice calls. No other services were available. This very first software attracted the first 
1 million registered users in only a matter of months. Subsequently, additional services (text chat, 
calls to and from regular telephones, video calls, etc.) and support for additional devices (Apple 
Mac, Linux, special ICT4 Phones and ICT4 application for various smartphones) appeared. 
ICT4 was not the first service to enter the VoIP market, but its ease of use, and the possibility of 
(multiparty) video calls, along with the free service, differentiate ICT4 very strongly from both 
other traditional and VoIP telephone services. The above, in combination with a hugely scalable 
peer-to-peer architecture and clever marketing made it an instant success. ICT4, which offered 
initially only voice calls, has also differentiated itself increasingly from the competition by offering 
video and multi-party conference calls. Video capable software appeared first for Microsoft 
Windows in 2008. The Android and iPhone software that was introduced in 2009 included also 
video functionality. ICT4 was also the first to utilise networked flat screen TV-s, which have started 
to include built-in ICT4 software since 2010. 
ICT4 had already 75 million registered users by 2005. As of 2011, ICT4 has more than 560 million 
registered users. The “cross-border traffic routed by ICT4, by far the largest provider of Internet-
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based voice communications, is projected to grow by an astonishing 45 billion minutes in 2010—
more than twice the volume added by all of the world’s phone companies, combined.” (Figure 12). 
Furthermore, 40 percent of ICT4 calls are actually video calls today (ICT4 2010, Tuaw 2011). 
 
Figure 12: International long-distance calls and ICT4 traffic 2005-2010. 
 
Source: Telegeography 2011. 
 
ICT4 has gone truly global not only in terms of its customer base, but also in terms of the location 
of its business functions during the last five years. As noted above, it was the combination of the 
experienced Scandinavian start-up managers and Estonian engineering talent that were at the core 
of ICT4’s immediate success. Soon, as ICT4 was seeking to attract international venture capital and 
to get closer to major marketing channels, the corporate headquarters were established in 
Luxembourg and an office was also set up in London. Although the headquarters were in 
Luxembourg, Tallinn and London remained the largest offices, and most of the decision-making 
continued to take place between these two offices. 
In Q4 2005, eBay purchased ICT4 for approximately 2.5 billion U.S. dollars of upfront payment 
(eBay 2005). In connection with this deal, an ICT4 office was also set up in the United States, close 
to eBay's headquarters. The ICT4 office in the United States continued to operate as a marketing, 
sales and support office servicing the Americas. More recently, general management of the business 
line was also moved to the U.S., as the Americas are globally the largest market for enterprise 
communications, and some of the ICT4’s strategic partners for this business line, e.g., Avaya, are 
also located there. 
Smaller ICT4 offices emerged also in Singapore and Hong Kong. These offices are in charge of the 
marketing, sales and support in Asia. Their perhaps even more important function is to maintain 
close contacts with the manufacturers of the increasing variety of different ICT4 enabled devices, 
including flat screen TVs, in Asia (Figure 13).  
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Figure 13: The location of ICT4 sites 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: ICT4, October 2010. 
 
Even though PayPal, another eBay firm, proved a good payment partner for ICT4, eBay itself was 
not able to build major synergies between its main business line and ICT4. Furthermore in 2008, a 
legal dispute emerged between ICT4 and its original founders over the rights to ICT4’s underlying 
peer-to-peer communications technology. This contributed to the lessening of eBay’s interest in 
ICT4 even further. Eventually, in November 2009, eBay sold 70% of ICT4 to a consortium 
comprising Silver Lake Partners, CPPIB, Andreessen Horowitz, and the original Scandinavian 
founders, valuing the business at 2.75 billion dollars.  
Less than a year later, in August 2010, ICT4 filed with the SEC for listing on the NASDAQ stock 
exchange, where it sought to raise up to 100 million dollars in an initial public offering (ICT4 
2010). These plans were, however, cancelled, as ICT4 and Microsoft entered into a definitive 
agreement in spring 2011,whereby Microsoft will acquire ICT4 for 8.5 billion dollars. Once 
approval is received from the regulators, ICT4 will become a new business division of Microsoft. It 
is quite obvious, even though no public information exists in this relation, that Microsoft was 
willing to pay a very high price for ICT4 both in order to secure its late entry into the very rapidly 
growing VoIP market as well as to avoid the further strengthening of the other dominant firms in 
this market. 
ICT4 has been, typically for a venture capital backed start-up, essentially from its birth in an 
aggressive growth phase, and the availability of suitably qualified labour has been one of its 
important concerns. Initially ICT4 hired engineers and other personnel, e.g. for localisation and 
support functions, etc., rather aggressively in Estonia. However, as it emerged that no more suitably 
qualified labour was available in Estonia, a second engineering centre was established in Prague in 
2007.  
Overall, ICT4 continued to recruit its personnel internationally, indicating quite often for an open 
position two or three key locations where the newly enrolled person could start working. This has 
led to ICT4’s rather unique management model, where the various multidisciplinary teams operate 
indeed in most cases within ICT4 but on a trans-country basis. For example, the Prague engineering 
centre operates today largely as a satellite of the primary engineering centre in Tallinn. The Prague-
 D6.1: Research papers on “Fragmentation of GINs and capability building in the automotive, ICT 
and agro-processing industries” -  
“Nordic small countries in the global high-tech value chains: the case of telecommunications 
systems production in Estonia” 
 
 
Page 183 of 240 
based developers report to the team leaders who typically are located in Estonia. It is also quite 
common for the product managers and other mid-level managers who are in charge of development 
to be located part- or even full-time outside Estonia, for example in London or elsewhere. 
ICT4 has acquired the required talents rather aggressively by acquiring other smaller firms that have 
the personnel with the required capabilities, relocating, if necessary, also the persons concerned to 
one of its offices. The purchase of a Norwegian start-up, a provider of voice technology for the 
Internet, in April 2006 is an example of the flexibility companies like ICT4 exhibit in attracting the 
very top talents11. The main motivation behind this acquisition was really the knowledge and talent 
this Norwegian company had regarding audio-video codecs12 and regarding VoIP systems more 
broadly. As the acquired company itself did not yet even have an office in Norway, an office was 
set up for them in Stockholm, the closest possible location to the engineering centre in Tallinn. 
Nowadays, in this ICT4 Stockholm office some of the most advanced audio-video R&D in Europe 
takes place. Given the deep specialisation and the knowledge pool that is available in this ICT4 unit, 
a close exchange of information also takes place there with different research institutes and 
universities across the globe. 
“ICT4 currently employs 850 staff, with most of its engineers in Estonia, though its disparate 
operations include a Luxembourg headquarters, marketing operations in London and audio-visual 
engineering in Stockholm. [The ICT CEO] said he plans to hire up to 400 new staff this year, with 
80 per cent of these in Silicon Valley” (FT 2011). The newly established engineering facility in 
Palo Alto, California, will specialise primarily on development for the Apple IOS and Google 
Android mobile computing platforms, for which engineering personnel is more easily available on 
the western coast of the United States as compared to Europe. 
 
 
5. Competence-building on the enterprise level in Estonia 
 
5.1. Worker level  
ICT2, ICT3 and ICT4 as global firms operate in very different market segments in the production of 
telecommunications systems. The specialisation and, thus, also the labour requirements of the 
Estonian subsidiaries of these firms are also very different. Both ICT2 and ICT3 primarily 
manufacturing and various support activities in Estonia, while ICT4 has its main software 
development centre located in Estonia. The structure of the labour force of these firms is, 
accordingly, also very different in Estonia. Manufacturing floor workers constitute a significant 
share of ICT2’s and ICT3’s employees in Estonia. Contrastingly, ICT4 chiefly employs engineering 
                                                     
11
  In early 2011, Skype acquired another well-known Internet video communications firm Qik, in order to reinforce 
Skype’s video functionality even further. 
12
  A codec is a specialised software (or device), which is capable of encoding and/or decoding a signal or a digital data 
stream. Audio and video codecs that are discussed here are responsible for encoding the analog audio and video signals 
into a digital data stream and decoding these in the receiving end pack into a voice and video that a human being can 
understand. 
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personnel in Estonia, and the lower qualification levels are of limited importance for this firm. This 
is obviously also reflected in the capability building of these firms. 
Furthermore, it is largely the former ICT3 personnel that operate today’s ICT2 plant in Tallinn. 
Therefore, most ICT3-related observations simultaneously also reflect human resource development 
that has taken place in relation to the plant in Tallinn now owned by ICT2. 
In the early 1990s, when ICT3 started its manufacturing operations in Estonia, it built largely on the 
personnel that had become available from the former Soviet electronics industry. At this period in 
time, low (labour) costs and the geographical and cultural proximity to Finland made Estonia an 
attractive location for the expansion of production. Today, most of the enrolled workers are 
expected, preferably, to have previous work experience in the electronics industry. The textile and 
clothing industry, where employment was decreasing in the 2000s, has also however been an 
important source of experienced manufacturing workers for electronics manufacturing in Estonia.  
Previous work experience is also important, as advanced electronics manufacturing involves some 
tasks, e.g. tuning radio communications equipment or diagnostics of manufactured products, where 
the necessary skills and productivity levels can only be achieved in practice. Today, an average 
ICT3 manufacturing flow worker has 5-6 years of work experience in the firm. With the cyclical 
downturn in the industry, ICT3 had some redundancies in the workforce the first half of 2009. More 
recently, however, a number of previous workers have been attracted back to their old jobs. 
ICT3 Tallinn considers the flexibility of its work organisation one of its main competitive 
advantages. The workers need to be able to switch rapidly from the needs of one client and the 
related manufacturing setup to another. Continuous on-the-job (client-specific) training to 
familiarise the workers with the specific production line and their specific tasks during the 
manufacturing process is the main training activity that takes place in ICT3 and ICT2 at this 
qualification level. It is not uncommon for such training that one of the more knowledgeable 
operators of the surface mounting equipment (SMA operators, for short) instructs the other 
assemblers and operators, while the Quality Control Department oversees and supports such an 
internal training process when necessary. 
Contrastingly, the limited number of basic worker level staff members only plays a minor support 
role in ICT4, where most of the staff are involved in advanced engineering tasks in Estonia. 
Accordingly, this is not the key qualification level for capability building within ICT4. 
 
5.2. Technical and supervisory level 
In ICT3, worker training is also connected with career opportunities, as more knowledgeable and 
experienced workers have the possibility to acquire qualifications that allow them to become 
foremen, who are in charge of groups of workers. Typically, such senior workers are also 
themselves familiar with the basics of business management and quality control techniques like Six 
Sigma or similar. In other words, there is a clearly established and well-communicated career path 
in ICT3. This is also the preferred way the supervisory level staff grow within the company. 
In addition to client and product-specific training, management training is offered to supervisory-
level workers, such as for example foremen. The management training offered to them includes 
skills for motivating team members, enhancement of skills for cooperation with engineers from 
other teams, quality control, etc. All foremen have a basic, i.e. yellow belt level knowledge of Six 
Sigma. Importantly, foremen and senior workers are also in charge of acquiring workers’ proposals 
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for improvement (innovation!). Such a continuous improvement system is also supported through 
the bonus system. 
The company is building linkages with the Estonian education system. The main strategic partner is 
a university of Applied Sciences, which is a professional higher educational institution, with the aim 
of providing professional higher educational studies (engineering diploma education, with 4 years 
of study) in the field of engineering. 
For ICT4, the technical level is really the lowest qualification level that is relevant to its core 
activities. The technical jobs in this firm still related to basic web development, language 
translation, etc., as well as various maintenance and support activities. The difference between the 
technical and engineering levels is essentially that of the creativity, technology and management 
knowledge, and of the experience of the respective persons. There is, therefore, similarly to ICT3, a 
possibility for technical workers to become engineers, in case they acquire more knowledge and 
experience. 
This is why ICT4 has an on-line Global Learning Zone (GLZ) that contains specific learning 
materials accessible to everyone in the firm. There is also a specialised on-line reference library of 
technical literature that everyone can access. The objective of the GLZ is to lead all staff members 
to the relevant reading materials and/or training courses they consider necessary for themselves. 
Another related objective is to keep everyone in the firm up to date on the modus operandi of the 
firm and to communicate forthcoming changes in the organisation. 
Technical jobs are ones for which, universally for all case study firms, internship opportunities are 
most frequently offered. Intern recruitment is handled through the regular recruitment channels. 
Higher qualification levels are, as it is easy to understand, normally not open to interns due to the 
greater importance of the previous training and work experience, as well as sensitivity of materials 
used. 
 
5.3. Engineering levels  
Workers and foremen do not have direct communications with clients for whom ICT3 and ICT2 
manufacture their products. In ICT3, such communication is limited to the management and 
engineers who are in charge of setting up production lines, including systems for testing product 
quality. The division of tasks is basically the same in ICT2 between the R&D and product 
development that takes place outside Estonia, and the manufacturing that takes place in Estonia.  
From the mid-2000s ICT3 built up a New Product Introduction (NPI) unit in Estonia, which was to 
assist clients in the final design and testing of their electronics products and in the preparation of 
production. This unit disappeared in ICT3 with the transition of most of ICT3’s previous activities 
and staff members to ICT2 in 2010. Currently, ICT3’s engineering facilities are very tiny in 
Estonia. ICT3 currently has four product engineers, two process engineers and one test engineer 
currently in Estonia. Additionally, there are 7 quality control engineers, and 7 engineers who are in 
charge of after-market (repair) services. In other words, the engineering workforce is clearly a 
minor share of ICT3’s 300-person workforce in Estonia. 
ICT3 has recently recruited a new product engineer and a new quality control engineer 
simultaneously with the introduction of a new client. For the introduction of the new engineers (as 
well as other supervisory level workers) to the firm, a 6-month in-house training programme is 
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provided. After that, typically, the client trains the ICT3 engineers in the course of the introduction 
of the new products on the related requirements. No other broader intra-firm training system exists 
for engineers.  
There is, however, strong competition for the best workforce between the different (mostly foreign-
owned) electronics manufacturers in Estonia, which on occasion leads to intense headhunting. For 
example, it has been very difficult for ICT3 to recruit a new lead engineer in Estonia recently in 
spite of active headhunting. 
In summary, it still cannot be said that the lack of strong engineers with industrial experience has 
been the most important impediment to ICT3’s activities being upgraded from electronics 
manufacturing service provision to the more R&D and knowledge-intensive design of its products. 
It has rather been the deliberate decision of the whole of ICT3 as a global EMS service provider to 
not compete with its customers in R&D and product development.  
Computer scientists and software engineers have generally been easier to find and recruit than 
microelectronics and industrial engineers in Estonia. ICT4’s main engineering facilities are, as 
discussed above, largely located in Estonia for historic reasons. This is where software development 
in ICT4 was initially established and additional engineering workforce was recruited as necessary. 
The Global Learning Zone is, as discussed above, the key learning resource within ICT4. All the 
various training possibilities are communicated across all ICT4 offices through this tool. In staff 
training the 70-20-10 principle applies: 70% of learning occurs on the job, 20% in the form of intra-
firm coaching/mentorship, and no more than 10% of the working time is dedicated to classroom 
training or similar. For the latter, trainers come mainly from other EU member states (mostly the 
UK) as well as the United States.  
 
5.4. Management and marketing levels  
None of the three case study firms have their top management located in Estonia, i.e. their overall 
strategic planning and management take place elsewhere. Their marketing and sales activities are 
also, typically of any multinational corporation, globally dispersed and located close to (potential) 
key customers. Normally, the personnel of Estonian subsidiaries do not have a direct role in 
marketing and sales, except for ICT2’s marketing and sales on the Estonian market. 
It is the business development managers at the corporate level who are in charge of client 
interaction, and hand over the planning of the specific production lines over to the engineers in 
ICT3. In this, the choice of the specific manufacturing plant depends largely on the general industry 
dynamics, the location and the needs of the client rather than anything else. In ICT2, largely the 
same model applies, although the ‘client’ is either the headquarters or another subsidiary in the 
same firm. The subsidiary in Estonia is, in both cases, effectively locked in manufacturing and 
support functions that the overall corporate strategy and the allocation of roles between the different 
subsidiaries foresee.  
Capability building at the management level is in any international firm ultimately about the 
recruitment of the right persons, and offering them stimuli for personal development and 
achievement of corporate business objectives.  
ICT3 has a global HR organisation, which has strengthened in the last few years. They offer a 
global personal development plan and bonus system, which seeks to translate the management 
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targets set for a specific manufacturing site into the objectives and stimuli offered to the individual 
staff members. Also, the standardisation of the work places has started recently across the different 
subsidiaries in ICT3. Currently, there is an on-going, bottom-up mapping process whose aim is to 
document existing work places. Thereafter, the global HR organisation will be advising, top-down, 
the individual subsidiaries on possible revisions to their existing HR management and organisation 
of work. 
What makes the internal management structure of ICT4 different is that it grew very rapidly from a 
small start-up firm to a major global actor. Initially, in ICT4, personnel were largely recruited in 
different geographic locations where it was available at a particular point in time. The cost of 
explosive growth, which a successful VC-backed start-up must achieve, is, however, the extremely 
rapid growing complexity of its corporate management. As a result, there are today virtually no 
functional teams within ICT4, where the team itself, the head of the team, and the boss of the head 
of the team would be located in the same country.  
This is why ICT4 has now started to streamline its HR strategy, and is increasingly applying a 
competence-centre model. The aim is to concentrate the specific competences typically into no 
more than two offices. This is, obviously, to allow for greater synergy between the staff members, 
and to simplify the management. While the very top R&D talents may possibly remain an 
exception, where there is a lot of flexibility and interest for cooperation across the globe, the majority of 
the personnel are now increasingly employed in the existing locations of the specific teams within 
ICT4 that require additional workforce. 
Centralised HR management, including personal development and training activities, has also been 
instituted in ICT4. The internal organisation of ICT4’s HR Department largely the above general 
competence-centre model. Each of the competence areas, e.g. engineering, etc., has its own global 
head of HR. The HR Department in Estonia deals primarily with the recruitment of the engineering 
work force. In human resources management, the development of the personal development plans 
of employees plays an important role in ICT4, as personal development is very important in keeping 
the creative class motivated in their work. 
The SCRUM management technique is applied in the software development process in ICT4. It is 
an iterative process, where interdisciplinary teams select from the backlog a set of more important 
requests for improvement and implement these within a limited timeframe (typically a two to four-
week period). For the improvement of the use of the SCRUM technique within ICT4, mostly United 
States-based external experts have been used. 
ICT4 offers separate training resources and programmes for the management staff. There is, for 
example, a 3-day joint management training programme with Harvard Business School on 
“managing the ICT4 way”, which discusses a broad set of themes that are topical for a multicultural 
global firm (active listening, international communications, tough conversations, etc.). 
The recruitment of competent leaders for groups of 100-150 people remains problematic both in 
Estonia and Europe in general. The most often suitably qualified (and experienced) managers are 
found in the United States. Such managers are, therefore, often recruited in the US and seconded for 
2-3 years in Estonia or another European office, as needed. Mobility is also very active between the 
different ICT4 offices in the opposite direction. Estonian staff members have been, for example, 
active in building up various other offices and are currently also active in building up ICT4’s new 
development centre in the United States.  
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5.5. Innovation levels  
The above case studies very clearly that both the importance of the staff on the different 
qualification levels as well as the capability building that occurs at the corporate level are very 
strongly dependent on the strategy of a particular firm and its role in global production and 
innovation networks.  
Electronics manufacturing service providers, such as ICT3, manufacture various products that are 
developed by major industry leaders, such as ICT2, and its own R&D activities remain very modest. 
The innovation and the related capability building that take place in electronics manufacturing still 
primarily have to do with process and organisational innovation (Figure 14). ICT3’s service line for 
New Product Introduction is perhaps the closest to what could be considered to be joint R&D 
activities with clients.  
The same largely applies for manufacturing plants that major brand names like ICT2 own 
themselves. It is perhaps just that the latter manufacturing facilities tend to be used more often for 
the introduction of completely new products than ones owned by independent service providers.  
Microelectronics design-related activities are, however, currently very strongly constrained by the 
lack of suitable engineering and R&D workforce in Estonia. Furthermore, the high and increasing 
capital intensity of the modern microelectronics industry seems to be one of the main reasons the 
various indigenous ICT firms focus on software rather than microelectronics. 
 
Figure 14: Technological upgrading within ICT3 in Estonia 
Source: authors. 
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ICT4 has its main R&D and engineering centre, where most of the development and testing of new 
products and services takes place, located in Estonia. This does not mean, however, that the basic 
research or in-house R&D would be the predominant source of learning and capability-building in 
ICT4. Much less formalised forms of learning by doing, interaction within the different ICT4 
offices and ICT4’s outside partners, as well as corporate education and training resources, continue 
as much more important sources of inspiration for ICT4’s software developers (Figure 15).  
Furthermore, it is perhaps the key lesson from the case of ICT4 (from the above cases) that building 
a highly innovative and successful business does not always necessitate major basic R&D efforts. 
The overall competitive situation in the industry, the major technological breakthroughs that occur 
independently of any specific firm, and many other factors can prove much more important than the 
R&D efforts of a particular firm. 
 
Figure 15: Technological upgrading within ICT4 in Estonia 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: authors. 
 
The cooperation between ICT4 and the public education and R&D systems of different countries 
has also thus far remained fairly limited, as public education systems are always slow to respond 
and the company in an early expansion phase could not wait for too long to actually see the 
results13. Instead, ICT4 has, as discussed above, acquired the required talents rather aggressively, 
                                                     
13 However, Skype continues to make attempts to initiate cooperation with higher education institutions in order to 
strengthen the future supply of qualified labour in Estonia. So far, this cooperation has mostly taken the form of Skype 
engineers lecturing at specific courses in Estonia. As part of such interaction with universities, research topics are also 
proposed for master’s and doctoral theses, etc. 
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where they could be found more easily and quickly, relocating, if necessary, the persons concerned 
to one of its offices.  
Overall, all of the three cases exemplify that the innovation takes place in industry is often much 
more multifaceted than is often assumed in innovation studies. It is not enough to focus on R&D, 
when in analysing the evolution of the GINs and the related capability building. The different 
sources and forms of innovation, including learning by doing, adoption of technologies developed 
elsewhere, organisational and business model innovations, all need to be taken into consideration. 
 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
6.1. Industry life cycles and relocation of production and innovation  
The industry life cycles and techno-economic paradigms literature (Vernon 1966, Perez 2002), 
which unfortunately does not get too often referred to in innovation studies, seems to explain the 
observed industry development pattern very nicely. According to this literature, the various 
economic activities get gradually relocated from developed to the developing economies, as the 
technologies disseminate, initial knowledge advantages vanish and, thereby, the importance of the 
economies of scale increases in time14 15.  
The Nordic mobile telephony industry pioneers originally designed and manufactured most of the 
critical components of mobile telephone systems in-house. Soon, as production volumes increased, 
they started contracting certain manufacturing functions out to electronics manufacturing service 
providers like ICT3 while keeping critical technological know-how, product design and marketing 
functions in-house. When demand on more distant markets followed the lead of the Nordic 
countries, major producers globalised very rapidly, also thereby bringing about the globalisation of 
their manufacturing service providers and service centres like ICT3. It was the very closely-knit 
business relationship between ICT3 and its key customers that did not allow ICT3 to compete with 
its clients in R&D and product development. 
However, nothing denied competitors from developing similar technologies and products. 
Therefore, after some time, the focal point in the industry started to shift from developed countries 
to developing countries, as developed markets became saturated and local producers, like Samsung, 
Huawei, HTC or LG, strengthened on the emerging markets. As a result, the Nordic manufacturers 
find themselves today squeezed between Apple as a new entrant to the high end of the market, and 
the various Asian manufacturers who also keep increasing their market share. 
                                                     
14 Traditionally, the off-shoring primarily entailed for the relocation of production, after-sales support and customer 
care, etc.  
15
 In this context, usually, the natural resource-seeking, market-seeking, and efficiency-seeking have been the main 
motivation for investment in developing countries. R&D is not, however, as important a type of input in traditional 
industries as it is in ICTs today (Moncada-Paternò-Castello et al 2010). This also perhaps explains why  
the strategic technological assets or capabilities-seeking behaviour has also recently become more important, especially 
in the context of the relocation of science-based industries (Dunning & Lundan 2008:67). 
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Along with the above, consolidation continues to take place in the industry, and earning power 
keeps shifting to firms that are able to establish and control dominant technology platforms from 
R&D and product development to production and all sorts of value added services, including the 
various applications that run on modern smartphones. 
In fact consolidation continues to take place not only on the supply side, but also on the demand 
side of the industry, as large telecommunications service providers, e.g., Vodafone, France 
Telecom, and Telefonica, have acquired shares of various smaller operators across the globe. As a 
result, both clients’ and suppliers’ market power has increased remarkably, and the barriers to entry 
have been heightened for latecomers to the industry.   
 
6.2. Capability building and the catching-up strategies for the latecomers 
The established platform leaders in the production of telecommunications systems continue to enjoy 
vast economies of scale across their whole value chain from R&D and production to marketing and 
sales. For these reasons, independent market entry has become increasingly difficult for latecomers 
to the established industry, unless they are able to challenge the established technological standards 
or business models, thereby altering the established rules of the game. 
The above three cases are in this context very interesting, as ICT2, ICT3 and ICT4 have all 
specialised in very different parts of the mobile telephony value chain. Both the time of their market 
entry as well as the rationale of their global location choice, including the requirements for the 
workforce, have also varied substantially. ICT2 has specialised in the design and production of its 
own telecommunications equipment for a long time, and has a long tradition of related in-house 
R&D activities. Together with the Finnish ICT company, ICT2 defined a whole new industry in the 
1980-1990s with their R&D efforts and entry to the mobile telephony industry. This allowed them 
to reap the benefits of early growth in this industry. 
Later on, the partnerships with or acquisitions of the relevant units of the competing firms have 
been some of the strongest shapers of ICT2’s global innovation and production networks. Different 
technical standards have also played a very important role in influencing the location choice for 
R&D and innovation. For example, China has been successful in utilising the vast market size of its 
domestic market in reinforcing its own technological standards. This has forced major equipment 
manufacturers to customise their already existing products or to develop new ones. This has also 
allowed for domestic latecomer firms, such as Huawei, more time for product development. China 
has also been successful in using its administrative power for increasing the importance of local 
input in foreign investment enterprises’ production activities, thereby gradually upgrading the 
capabilities of local suppliers. This is for example how ICT3’s local supplier network was gradually 
upgraded from basic metals and plastics to various electronics parts in China.  
The above is obviously not so easy to follow in smaller firms and economies that do not have a 
large pool of R&D workforce or significant market power. The case of ICT4 illustrates, 
nonetheless, that even tiny newcomer actors can actually outcompete established, major 
multinational firms, if they are able to adopt new disruptive technologies and business models that 
allow for transforming the rules of the game in the whole industry.  
Even though ICT4’s success is very strongly a result of Estonia’s engineering talent, this success 
story would have never happened without access to international top-class venture capital and 
experienced senior management. It is, therefore, perhaps the most important lesson of all of the 
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above case studies that capability building in terms of technological capabilities is extremely 
necessary. It is, however, not sufficient for participation in global production and innovation 
networks, and successfully catching up. This success still ultimately depends on the right time for 
market entry, superior product(s), a winning business strategy and world-class execution. 
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1. Executive summary1 
This case study looks into the North–South relations in the global innovation network of a large 
Scandinavian ingredient producer, Agro1. The first part of this paper provides background on the 
company, the internationalization of its market, production and innovation activities. The company 
is a large and highly innovative firm, anchored within the Scandinavian agro-food innovation 
system, which is currently undergoing a global restructuring, including increased 
internationalization of innovation activities. Looking from the analytical point of view of Global 
Innovation Networks (GINs), the development of the firm from being an integrated company to 
becoming a highly internationalized knowledge-intensive one will be a part of this story (the I: 
innovation), as will the entry into new locations in emerging markets (the G: global) and its patterns 
of collaboration within and beyond its (global) value chain (the N: network).The first section of this 
paper presents the background of the company and the push-factors behind the internationalization 
of R&D and other innovation activities in the company. 
Thereafter, the focus will be on this company’s recent entry into the national innovation system of 
South Africa. This will be covered as follows:1) a short introduction to the location attractiveness of 
South Africa as an entry point into the African markets; 2) a presentation of the South African 
context, focusing on the elements that constitute location attractiveness in the food industry; 3) the 
current research activities in South Africa. Finally, the conclusion underlines the importance of 
differentiating between different types of locations and their attractiveness. One strand of the 
company’s global innovation network is a purely home-exploiting strategy in which the company 
follows customers into new markets; in this case, the African market. Another strand includes 
home-augmenting strategies, where the company taps into external sources of knowledge through 
joint ventures and take-overs of developers of ingredients, i.e. for specialized local raw materials. 
 
 
2. Company background 
Agro1 is based in the agro-food industry and used to be a key player among the Scandinavian 
ingredient producers. It was originally a co-operative that developed into a world leader in 
ingredients and sustainable bio-based solutions for the food industry and other agro-related 
industries. The products are predominantly within biotech, and most are knowledge-intensive. Some 
products are highly specialized ingredients for leading firms in the food industry, such as 
emulsifiers, stabilizers, enzymes, cultures, protectants, sweeteners and sugar; the company supplies 
ingredients for products such as ice cream, cheese and bread. Hence, although not supplying 
directly to the end-customer, the products reach the global market through leading international 
food producers. 
This company is one of the largest producers of ingredients in the world. It has mainly grown by 
take-overs and mergers, nationally as well as internationally. As explained by a manager: “Within 
                                                     
1
 Due to confidentiality agreements, the name of the company remains with INGINEUS. The case study is based on in-
depth interviews with the company in Scandinavia (five interviews in the headquarters and the company network) and 
in South Africa (two visits to the South African affiliate), and on knowledge obtained from the corporate website, the 
media and company reports. 
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our niche, we are the leaders in the global market. Even though we are not a mega-company in 
terms of employees or market size, we are the leading company within our areas,” (interview, 
innovation manager). It was only in the late 1980s that the company emerged from sugar and spirit 
operations that were largely focused on the Scandinavian and EU markets. Following that time, the 
company decided on global food ingredients as a new strategic focus barely a decade and a half ago. 
Compared to many other companies in this sector, its global footprint is therefore of recent vintage. 
However, it pursued this strategy aggressively. In the early 2000s, the company acquired an 
internationally leading producer of industrial enzymes and bio-chemicals based abroad. This is one 
of the main milestones of this company’s internationalization strategy. 
The company is research intensive and has a strong focus on intellectual property. Last year, the 
company spent more than 6% of its revenue on R&D. It has a high ranking in the international 
‘patent board scorecard’ published by the Wall Street Journal. Every year, the company introduces 
approximately 700 new products. It holds more than 9,000 patents, which puts it in the top ten 
product innovators worldwide in the food, beverages, and tobacco category. Its innovation 
workforce numbers some 1,200 people:870of these work in R&D and the rest in application and 
customer service. 23% of the innovation workforce holds a PhD, and 44%aMaster’sdegree. The 
R&D platforms used to be spread widely, close to the largest markets, but have recently been 
centralized and are now concentrated in: the US, Central America, three in Scandinavia, the UK, the 
Netherlands, France, Singapore and China. 
The products are sold globally, reaching a market of more than 40 countries, and the company is 
very globalized in terms of its market. Approximately 40% of the revenue comes from Europe and 
another 40% from North America; the remaining 20% is generated in Latin America and Asia 
Pacific. Among the largest world regions marketwise, market growth rates are highest in Asia 
Pacific (8%). However, the growth rate is 15% outside these three regions (Rest of the world, e.g. 
Africa). Seemingly, the current markets have matured and the company is exploring possibilities in 
new regions, as we will investigate later in this paper with the recent investments in South Africa. 
Specialized knowledge is of high importance when the company collaborates with its customers. 
Since the products in the company relate to knowledge of ingredient solutions for the costumers, 
this knowledge is often developed and distributed with the customers. The innovation and R&D 
departments have a number of researchers who are familiar with food production, and often have 
long-term experience in the food industry. In other words, the company holds a high level of 
technological specialization, attractive to its customers. Many employees come from the more 
specialized segments of the food industry –as do those working in the sales teams. Hence, a large 
proportion of the employees have some technical educational background, including the sales 
teams. Since most of the business takes place in collaboration with the customers, i.e. leading firms 
in the food industry, the location of specialized staff mirrors the location of these companies, which 
are highly internationalized. 
The internationalization of R&D has required new tools of communication and new strategies of 
co-ordination. To facilitate cross-location collaboration, the corporate culture has been transferred 
to and implemented within the different R&D departments with minor local adjustments. As 
researchers often work together in teams across national boundaries, this common culture is 
important. The culture is defined using the following key phrases: “designed for innovation”, 
“encourage willingness to take risk”, “curiosity”, “freedom”, “trust”, “networks”, “supporting 
entrepreneurs”, “willingness to change”, “room for all”, “open-mindedness”, “experimenting at all 
levels”. Accordingly, it takes time and effort to impose this organizational culture outside 
Scandinavia. A newly hired employee undertakes approximately two years of training before 
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becoming an expert in finding solutions. One of the initiatives for generating innovation is the 
appointment of ‘CreActors’, which are internally-appointed professional consultants with the task 
of assisting creative employees with new ideas and helping them to advance those ideas within the 
company. 
Still, most innovation takes place in collaboration with customers, and often takes the form of 
incremental innovation; e.g. minor adjustments to existing products. This is generally how the food 
sector is characterized and often works – limited radical innovation. A radical innovation is made 
when an invention is approved by the Innovation Co-ordination Committee (ICC). ICC ensures that 
the same structure and approach to project management exists across research centers. ICC has six 
members and collaborates closely with the management team, bridging basic research and 
innovation breakthroughs with the top management. This is where funds are allocated for projects at 
a pre-market stadium – to generate and prioritize ‘breakthrough’ innovations. 
The global market for food ingredients is estimated at US$24bn. This company’s products 
compete in market segments that account for about US$10bn, with this company as the largest 
player overall. Competitors include Cargill (US), Kerry (IE), Huber (DK/US), Cognis (D), Chr. 
Hansen (DK), ABF (UK), and Tate&Lyle (UK). Industrial enzymes turn over some US$3bn 
globally. From outside Scandinavia, other important enzyme manufacturers include DSM (NL), AB 
Enzymes (D), BASF (D), Shin-Nihon (JP), and Amano (JP), plus smaller players. Moreover, this 
company is very competitive and holds a very strong market position. The frontier in food 
ingredient research is very varied. Food processors continuously demand new products. 
Accordingly, ingredient and enzyme companies need to anticipate future needs and identify 
technological opportunities relevant to the customers some three years ahead of time (i.e. the time 
necessary to develop the product). To this end,they also scan the world for new technologies as well 
as developing them in-house. The company has generally grown through takeovers, and uses 
venture capital to buy equity in promising start-ups. In order to keep track of new tendencies, the 
company’s innovation experts regularly and actively attend scientific conferences, such as IUFOST. 
The company has more than 60 subsidiaries and holding companies in more than 40 countries, the 
large majority of which are located in Europe, followed by the US and Mexico. This reflects their 
geographic turnover. Africa is in the ‘rest of the world’ category, which accounts for less than 3% 
of turnover. In Africa, Egypt has a sales office, but the major operation is in South Africa – both 
Johannesburg and Cape Town – from where the company supplies 50 countries in sub-Saharan 
Africa. At the same time, some developing countries evidently show high growth, which is why the 
company has an increasing presence in Asia and Latin America. For example, in 2008 the company 
set up a research center in Shanghai, which is projected to become one of the world’s leading 
enzyme discovery units. 
There is no question that this company is part of a GIN. Alongside its 40 production plants in all 
continents except Africa, it operates 21 R&D and application centers. Each R&D center has a 
specific competence (e.g. dairy processes and ingredients). Senior members are highly specialized 
in a particular area. When one center develops an innovation that it believes to have potential, it 
transmits it to the other centers for industrial application. If that proves successful, the innovation is 
rolled out across the group. Centers are not just supply-driven but also work on demand –also, 
production facilities can make requests to centers to work on a specific problem. In order to 
facilitate knowledge diffusion, the company employs a tool called Knowledge Search. This is a 
web-based platform, a Google-like search engine, allowing employees involved in innovation and 
application to access the company’s stock of knowledge. 
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The company engages in an innovation network beyond its value chains, and has R&D 
collaborations with numerous universities and research centers all over the world: 
Collaboration with universities happens mainly when we are going into basic research. We also 
source from universities. We have certain competencies that make us an interesting partner for the 
universities. If we have a topic we would like to know more about (for example, why meat is so 
easily spoilt), we collaborate with relevant universities to solve this issue. One part of innovation is 
the development of new knowledge and the other is applying this to our customers’ needs. 
Collaboration with universities is important in the development of new knowledge. In regard to 
application, the focus is more on recruitment of experts within products for new potential markets. 
What needs to be established, therefore, is whether locations in developing countries are part of 
this GIN, either through an evolution from a global production network or in a more ad-hoc fashion 
of tapping into new knowledge. The latter seems to be the case, as the customers’ locations are the 
determinant of the location of suppliers. Tastes and texture preferences vary according to relatively 
local markets, as do the available raw materials and their quality. One way in which developing 
countries can be identified as part of the GIN is if they host an innovation center. This applies, for 
example, to China, with the aforementioned center in Shanghai, and to Brazil. In a more indirect 
way, subsidiaries can be part of the GIN through the way in which the company creates knowledge 
(home-augmenting) and manages the knowledge diffusion process (home-exploiting). Knowledge 
Search allows internal researchers to explore internal knowledge systems across the R&D 
platforms. In addition to the knowledge sharing, the company posts success stories to encourage 
people to do a little extra for the company. 
Both types of R&D and innovation (application and basic research) take place at a global level. The 
company has strong principles in terms of how it organizes globally: 
We need to organize globally. In particular within food, as food types and tastes are very regional 
products. There are huge differences and also similarities. The large companies make the same 
products all over the world, but the products are indeed adjusted for local preferences – more than 
you would think. Besides the large companies there are many small- and medium-sized food 
producers, which are really locally-oriented. To meet their needs and get them as customers, we 
need to develop local raw materials, flavors and textures. Food quality also varies a lot. So we need 
to be local. 
According to the company, there are no real ‘push factors’ in the internationalization of innovation 
beyond the national innovation system around the food industry. The incentives for 
internationalizing research are not related to the cause of cost reductions. Qualified people abroad, 
even China, earn as much as those in Scandinavia and besides, find that highly qualified people and 
partners are readily available at home. In other business areas than innovation and R&D, the 
company has experienced push-factors. One example is within accountancy, which has been moved 
to Eastern Europe to save money. The company engages actively in industrial clusters at home. 
There are many good niches for food in the home economy, plus very qualified suppliers of 
machinery etc. with whom the company collaborates closely. Together with suppliers of machinery, 
they have developed package solutions, for example in ice cream, for producers who want to go into 
ice cream. At home, the company works with the ‘Knowledge Innovation Community’ (KIC) 
established by the European Union, aiming at generating a critical mass. One of the local 
universities is also an important agent in this. Moreover, the company is embedded in the national 
innovation system and the innovation networks that come from it. 
 
 D6.1: Research papers on “Fragmentation of GINs and capability building in the automotive, ICT 
and agro-processing industries” -  
“Agro-food. Case study from a leading Scandinavian ingredients firm” 
 
 
Page 201 of 240 
2.1 Having the ‘best brains’ is an important parameter of competitiveness 
So far, the company has very little activity in Africa at the moment. However, it is in the process of 
buying a local player in South Africa. This will potentially bring some possible innovation 
activities. Otherwise, the company has a tiny laboratory in South Africa supporting bread-producing 
customers operating there. In particular, the company is working on solutions to get low quality 
wheat rising with yeast: 
Generally, the raw materials for food in South Africa are of a very different standard than what we 
usually deal with, which is a huge challenge. However, our customers are moving into South Africa 
and we want to follow with some local solutions to the problems they face there. It is not always 
enough to send a technician from home. Having said that, we also prioritize having a critical mass 
of people more than local presence. So operations are specialized and we have developed a system 
of exchanging knowledge so that a problem in the bread industry in South America may be solved 
byour specialized team in Canada. 
Over the last decade, this company has shifted R&D into emerging economies in the South: China 
is an upcoming major player in biotechnology, which is why the company has placed a large R&D 
center there. In China, the universities produce a number of highly qualified PhDs every year, 
creating an exciting environment for the food industry. To establish this center, researchers from US 
spent 3–6 months at the China site to help in developing the culture etc. Prior to setting up an R&D 
unit, the company had been present in the Chinese market since 1997. India is a good place to 
source IT, but,so far, this company has not really established there. Establishing R&D abroad can 
also be a recruitment strategy. Attracting the right people from abroad into the R&D facilities can 
be difficult, as the flexibility for getting foreign employees to the national innovation system is 
limited and not all good knowledge can be generated within one location. 
There are different methods for identifying the best researchers. One is ‘The Knowledge Award’, 
which was launched in 2004 and awards students for innovative food and beverage products. This 
strengthens the company’s relations with universities and produces a good input into the company. 
Last year, the prizes went to Clemson University, Washington State University and the University 
of Arkansas. Another award is given every year to a young researcher or institution in the home 
economy. Finally, ‘The China Award’ is a competition among students from eight universities in 
China where the students are asked to apply the products of this company to Chinese food products. 
The more the company engages with diverse markets, the more it realizes the need for specific 
solutions for local products and related problems. Therefore, the company internationalized 
innovation and developed its global reach from exporting products into adjusting products for the 
local markets. After some expansion, this process ended. It was costly to have so many research 
facilities, and the company found that it had too many research locations around the globe. Today, 
the company has fewer R&D centers, and they are predominantly located where the company 
already has other functions. The main reason is that, although research needs to be independent at a 
certain level, the customers mean a lot to the company. A large part of the product development 
comes from collaborating with customers. 
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2.2 The location attractiveness of SA for Northern food-producers 
South Africa is the second largest receiver of foreign direct investments (FDI) in Africa, and hence 
is seen as a regional growth location. Compared to the other BRICS countries, however, South 
Africa receives the least FDI, and the growth seen in the other four BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India 
and China) has so far not been matched in the South African location (Roodt 2010). However, in 
the African context, South Africa stands as the country with most subsidiaries of multinational 
corporations (MNCs). In 2008, South Africa hosted more than 640 MNC affiliates. Most of the FDI 
originate from Europe (87.3%) and the US (8.5%) because of their traditionally strong ties with 
South Africa. One important issue is the removal of 90% of the trade barriers through the recent 
Trade, Development and Co-operation Agreement (TDCA) between the EU and South Africa 
(Olympio et al. 2009 in Roodt2010). 
Relevant factors for South African location attractiveness are the political stability and sustained 
economic growth over the last decade. South Africa has developed a strong national system of 
innovation in the region (Roodt2010) and a platform for market entry into Africa for leading global 
firms. The South African agro-food industry is an important trading partner because of, among 
other things, its counter-seasonality to Europe and its well-developed infrastructure. One of the 
more recent and important developments is the establishment of a cold chain in the South African 
transport sector. 
South Africa is also home to several large agro-food companies, of which some have become global 
players. One of these is the beer producer, SAB Miller – today, one of the largest beer brewers in 
the world. Some agro-food firms have also exported knowledge services, such as Illovo Sugar and 
Bosch Engineering in the sugar-milling field. In South Africa, it is notable that a number of 
companies have extended their reach in agriculture-related investments, such as the former Anglo-
American entities of Mode (forests and paper) and Tongaat-Hulett (sugar). Some major 
international agro-processing companies with a presence in South Africa include Unilever, Coca-
Cola, Parmalat, HJ Heinz, Kellogg, Nestlé, Danone, Cadbury-Schweppes, Virgin Cola, McCain 
Foods of Canada, and Pillsbury (Roodt 2010, US Department of State 2009). This presence is a 
clear indicator of economic development and stability as well as a high growth rate in the local 
market (Collinson 2009). 
Moreover, South Africa is a net exporter of agricultural products and, with only few exceptions, is 
self-sufficient in primary foods. With over 4000 food production companies, the country has the 
most developed food processing and manufacturing sector in Southern Africa.Agro-processing 
contributes 10% to GDP and employs 5% of the economically active population (DTI 2006). The 
food part alone accounts for more than 3% of GDP (Henderson 2010).2Consequently, the sector has 
attracted a number of international and local companies that use South Africa as a base to reach the 
domestic market, as well as other countries in Africa (Republic of South Africa 2006; see Table 1). 
The major players include Unifoods, Nestlé, National Brands, Tiger Brands and Premier Foods, 
Clover, Pioneer Foods, Foodcorp, Illovo and Langeberg Holdings. Furthermore, the increasing 
presence of food products from multinationals in domestic markets has intensified local 
competition, and places pressure on local firms to innovate in terms of what products they currently 
offer and how they produce them. Whereas large agro-industrial firms have the resources to invest 
                                                     
2
 Agro-processing here also includes non-food products such as fibre, (bio)fuel, and industrial raw materials. 
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in process and product innovation, smaller firms do not always, and their linkages with larger firms 
are generally weak (Felgenhauer and Labella 2009), meaning that some local players are becoming 
increasingly vulnerable. 
 
Table 1: International and local companies operating in the South African agro-food industry 
Company Country Industries 
Unilever Netherlands Processed foods 
Coca-Cola USA Beverages 
Parmalat Italy Dairy, beverages 
Nestle Switzerland Processed foods 
Danone France Dairy, beverages 
Kellogg USA Cereals, processed foods 
HJ Heinz USA Processed foods 
Pillsbury USA Beverages 
Virgin Cola UK Beverages 
Cadbury-Schweppes UK Processed foods, beverages 
Minute Maid UK Beverages 
McCain Foods Canada Processed foods 
Dole USA Fruit and vegetables 
Del Monte USA Fruit and vegetables 
Catmark France Fruit and vegetables 
South African Breweries UK Beverages 
Bulmers UK Beverages 
Tiger Brands South Africa 
Cereals and beverage, culinary, 
confectionary and healthcare products 
Premier Foods South Africa Processed foods 
Clover South Africa Dairy products 
Pioneer Foods South Africa Cereals, processed foods 
Foodcorp South Africa Processed foods 
TongaatHulett Group South Africa Sugar  
Langeberg Holdings South Africa Processed foods 
National Brands South Africa Processed foods 
Illovo Sugar South Africa Sugar  
   
Source: Emongor (2008) 
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The growth of the domestic market over the years has compelled both foreign and local MNCs to 
explore opportunities in neighboring countries. For example, SABMiller originated in South Africa 
and now has brewing and beverage interests in 30 African countries. The agro-food industry is 
important, and the combined revenue of the 111 largest African agro-food companies places the 
sector second after the oil, gas and fuel industry in the continent (Felgenhauer and Labella 2009). 
The competitive dynamics of the agro-industrial sector have resulted in an unprecedented need for 
specialized professional competencies, including in new bio- and nanotech materials and 
applications. The level and magnitude of professional expertise that is available to enterprises 
largely determines the position within the sector’s increasingly globalized value chains. The 
education systems of most developing countries are not, however, producing sufficient numbers of 
graduates with the skills required to meet the technical and competitive challenges posed by a 
rapidly evolving agro sector, in part because their curricula are slow to adapt to technical change 
characterizing the industry (Wilkenson and Rocha 2008). 
A recent study of agro-food companies in the Cape Town region (Lorentzen et al 2010) in fact 
reported problems with human capital at different levels. The firms interviewed – which included 
both subsidiaries of foreign MNEs and South African MNEs –learn from external knowledge which 
they access through their group, in the form of equipment imports, or atinternational trade fairs. A 
central element in both their strategy and their success is that they invest in learning and upgrading. 
This takes different forms, including in-house research on higher quality or new products and 
packaging. R&D alliances with international leaders, including parts of the same MNE group, lead 
to advanced knowledge absorption by the local partners. This is not an automatic process, but the 
outcome of systematic searches. The location-specific asset that allows for such partnerships to 
materialize is the relatively low cost of R&D personnel compared to advanced economies. 
Proximity of involved firms and tertiary education institutions, especially Stellenbosch University, 
facilitates localized knowledge spillovers in the form of a better understanding of what is 
technologically feasible in connection with what is commercially desirable. 
Most firms employ processes that are based on capital equipment that is world class. Its 
introduction is often facilitated by engineers from the foreign manufacturer, whotrain local 
operators. Hence, the production environment is little different from that of their advanced peers –
this also explains why products developed in South Africa by a MNE subsidiary are subsequently 
introduced to other parts of the world through the group (Lorentzen et al 2010).South Africa’s sugar 
industry is one of the most cost-competitive producers in the world and, since 2009, South Africa 
has had duty-free access to the EU market, creating significant export opportunities for the country 
(Roodt 2010). 
 
2.3 Internationalization of innovation in South Africa 
The affiliate of our case company in South Africa (hereafter: SA Affiliate) is responsible for 50 
countries in sub-Saharan Africa. It is headquartered in Johannesburg, in part because it is easier to 
access those markets from Gauteng than from Cape Town. SA Affiliate supplies all major food 
processing companies with high-technology ingredients. Hence, its portfolio does not include any 
standard commodities, but only more sophisticated ingredients such as: bacteria required to turn 
milk into yogurt or cheese; enzymes to make bread or detergents; hydrocolloids to make jam; and 
so on. SA Affiliate is a technology-intensive company, a fact that is reflected in its personnel: all 
sales people have technical degrees in food technology or similar. This allows sales people who are 
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in contact with customers to evaluate their needs jointly with them, and develop new products and 
processes. 
SA Affiliate differs from other subsidiaries around the world in that, to date, it has never had 
separate application or innovation staff from the sales personnel. (“Application” refers to changing 
processes or otherwise fixing problems at a customer’s site.) However, this is now changing in the 
sense that SA Affiliate has recently hired dedicated innovation and application staff. 
Like all other subsidiaries, SA Affiliate sources its entire complement of ingredients from the 
Group’s over 40 factories around the world. To date, there has been no manufacturing facility in 
Africa; hence, SA Affiliate does not produce, but at most blends ingredients sourced from the 
group. Still, blending is a high-technology activity that takes place using pharmaceutical equipment, 
owned by SA Affiliate, in Cape Town. The plant is geared to allow for contamination-free 
production of ingredients in sterile and dust-free environments. Most of the blending takes place on 
behalf of bakeries. Blending is idiosyncratic in that it corresponds to local needs. For example, a 
bakery will give SA Affiliate a new type of flour, which then needs to be matched optimally with a 
number of high-tech ingredients to create the best possible recipe. SA Affiliate has a very short 
turn-around time: testing some thirty possible blends, sampling and delivery of the final mix to the 
bakery is done within 24 hours after delivery of the new flour. This is an area where SA Affiliate 
aims to add to the group’s knowledge base; more about this below. 
Although recipes are made for local equipment, nutritional requirements and tastes –and thus the 
resulting product is unlikely to be attractive to external markets –it is possible for the group to learn 
from SA Affiliate’s processes. The group has an international knowledge base, accessible to key 
personnel around the world, that records any relevant technological innovation. The group also has 
‘expert teams’ with members from around the world (in baking, dairy, and so on) that interact on a 
bi-monthly basis. In the past, this system did not really pay attention to activities at SA Affiliate 
because it was run by and for application staff, which SA Affiliate did not have. Due to the blending 
process referred to above, this is now changing. Hence, SA Affiliate is increasingly involved in the 
GIN part of the company, not just marketing. 
The turn-around time of SA Affiliate’s blending processes is much faster than at any other plant 
within the group. Average turn-around times are four weeks; two weeks was hitherto acknowledged 
as extraordinary. The reason for the superiority of the process lies in the trade-off between scientific 
analysis of the flour, including several repeated trial bakes over time (which is time-consuming) on 
the one hand, and tacit knowledge whereby experts with a lot of experience can select the most 
suitable blends from a portfolio of 32 batches of test bakes on the other. Criteria include, among 
other aspects, softness, resilience and crumb structure. This does not deny the role of science, but 
scientific analysis of flour has limitations: it cannot accurately predict how a specific type of flour 
will behave in a bakery. Hence, blending involves a certain amount of trial and error anyway, and it 
is this experimenting and learning that the application of tacit knowledge can speed up. 
The origin of the 24-hour process lies with a South African company founded by two New 
Zealanders, which was taken over by the company in 2007. The local company had been very 
successful, but lacked resources to grow. A year and a half after its takeover, its business volume 
had increased fivefold. In fact, in its baking business, SA Affiliate has grown much faster than any 
other part of the group; so much so that it is considering building a second blending plant in 
Gauteng. The Group now plans to make the originators of the new process visit other plants around 
the world to explore a possible application elsewhere. Hence, there is knowledge transfer from 
South Africa to the rest of the world, including to developing countries. 
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The main reason that, to date, there has been no R&D and application center in South Africa is that 
the company only set up its South African operation in 2000. Until 2003, it employed a mere 13 
people between Cape Town and Johannesburg. By 2010, staff complement had risen to 78. Growth 
in turnover has been similar. Hence, there is now an opportunity to establish innovation activities in 
South Africa, and this will in fact happen shortly, with a focus on baking and dairy industries. The 
relevant personnel joined SA Affiliate in August, and the new center will initially have seven 
people responsible for innovation and application. It will be one of the smallest centers in the group. 
SA Affiliate tries to deal with the skills shortage in the country by identifying the resident most 
highly qualified core group of experts (which, for example, in baking amounts to a mere eight 
people) and employing them all. It also absorbs knowledge through acquiring smaller, knowledge-
intensive companies. For example, in the past it bought Innovative Ingredients, a Cape Town-based 
producer of bakery enzymes, and Bakesure, a Zimbabwe-owned premix supplier to the bakery trade 
(South Africa’s industrial bakery market is the fifth largest in the world). In August 2010, it 
acquired a small product development company focused on customized products and technical 
expertise for the food industry. Its portfolio includes stabilizing systems, compounds, concentrates 
and sauces. In this acquisition, the company pursued both the local skills and the relationships 
cultivated by the local player. In fact, it bought into the regional agro-processing innovation system 
in the Cape Town region (Lorentzen and Muller 2010). Furthermore, the local company had well-
established contacts with the relevant departments in the local universities, and has helped a local 
equipment supplier manage its contract research in its major target markets of the US, UK, and New 
Zealand. 
 
2.4 The establishment of a GIN, internationalization of innovation  
In previous work on internationalization of innovation in the agro-food industry, two models of 
internationalization of innovation were identified. The first model implies a reorganisation of 
innovation processes at a global scale, involving techno-scientific networks of specialized 
knowledge actors for research and development beyond the Triad regions (EU, US and Japan). This 
constitutes the capital G in relation to global innovation networks (GINs). The second model 
implies a stronger internationalization as Europeanization of innovation, mainly in the form of 
product development with actors in their regional innovation systems; this will constitute the lower 
case ‘g’, i.e. innovation networks that are not so global as those with a capital G. In terms of 
innovation – the ‘I’ in global innovation networks, the capital I is used for companies that organise 
innovation across their global R&D and production sites and introduce new-to-the-world 
innovations. The lower case ‘i’ is used for companies – or networks – that predominantly 
internationalize their innovation in order to adapt their products to new markets. Finally, for 
network – the capital ‘N’ is used when companies engage in collaborations beyond their own value 
chain, e.g. with universities and other research institutions, while lower case ‘n’ indicates that the 
network mainly includes suppliers and customers. 
While this company is one of the most internationalized Scandinavian companies in innovation, this 
internationalization varies according to specificities at the different locations. In locations with large 
markets, availability of human resources and existing research environments that can supplement 
those already accessible to the company, like the US and China, the company has established 
research facilities that engage in application as well as basic research for their global operations. 
Hence, seen from the home economy, the company performs well both in terms of home-exploiting 
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strategies (i.e. expanding the market for existing products) and in home-augmenting strategies (i.e. 
tapping into new knowledge). For the locations of basic research, this company has a strong 
international profile across the globe; it is Global with a capital “G”. The innovation activities 
carried out both include application of products to new markets and generate innovations for the 
future; innovation is with a capital “I”. Finally, the innovation activities predominantly take place in 
collaboration with customers. However, the company maintains strong relationships beyond its value chain, 
with universities; therefore, the network is with a capital “N”. In other words, it has, over recent decades, 
developed into a key player in its GIN – which is of major importance for sustaining its position in the 
ingredient and enzyme markets. This is supported by initiatives for creating a strong company culture and by 
developing and enhancing communication across innovation sites. 
Zooming into one link in the developing global innovation network, their emerging engagement in 
South Africa, provides interesting insights into the importance of which location is in focus. Having 
said this, SA Affiliate isnot involved in basic research, but has recently geared up to do applied 
research and development with relevance for the group. Its GIN has a capital “G” (due to the global 
knowledge presence of the group on which SA Affiliate can draw and to which it will contribute), a 
growing “i” (because it has just established an innovation-and-application unit that will work on 
bakery and dairy projects), and a medium-size and also growing “N” (in the sense that the emerging 
innovation portfolio implies that it will work more intensely outside the Group, i.e. with external 
partners such as universities). The GIN relations this company has established in the South African 
location is so far a GiN. 
 
 
3. The agro-food GINs and their impact on South Africa3 
This section will reverse the picture and consider the above story from a South African perspective. 
What is the impact of the company’s entry into innovation in South Africa in terms of upgrading 
local players? 
In South Africa, the company has 61 employees located in Cape Town and Johannesburg. South 
Africa is the biggest market in sub-Saharan Africa, making up 85–90% of sales, followed by 
Nigeria and Kenya. The company opened the South African subsidiary in 2000. In August 2010,it 
acquired 100% of a local Cape Town firm, SA Affiliate. SA Affiliate offers customized ingredients 
solutions, and primary markets are dairy and fruit juices. Before being purchased, about 25 people 
were working at SA Affiliate. About 20 of them were based in Cape Town, with a few sales people 
based in the Eastern Cape and Johannesburg. Ingredients were bought from most of the ingredient 
suppliers in South Africa, such as the case company. 
 
3.1 How innovation worked at SA Affiliate 
When SA Affiliate started out, about 80% of its revenues came from consulting fees, project 
management, project work and other services. As clientele grew, a larger share of revenues came 
                                                     
3
 Research for this section was conducted by Luke Muller, May 2011. 
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from supplying products. By the time SA Affiliate joined the case company, about 90% of revenues 
were brought in from product sales.  
SA Affiliate does “straight” development and charges a development fee and product development 
and supply toa customer; the development fee is forfeited and revenues are earned from supplying 
ingredients. Newly developed IP is then kept, to retain value within SA Affiliate’s products. 
Supplying customers with ingredients or a solution provides a stream of revenue over the lifespan 
of the product, whilst services charge a once-off fee only. 
There was a production component within SA Affiliate prior to joining the case company, but this 
was mainly outsourced. SA Affiliate stuck primarily to its core business of product development. 
Once a product was developed, production was outsourced to contract blenders in Johannesburg. 
SA Affiliate would then supply the product to clients. For example, SA Affiliate would develop a 
yogurt stabilizer for a customer; the recipe would then be sent to a contract blender in 
Johannesburg, and SA Affiliate would deliver the final product to the customer. 
 
3.2 Why and how the case company bought SA Affiliate 
When the case company bought SA Affiliate, they acquired its local R&D capacity. With the case 
company being based in Europe (Scandinavia), the South African and African market is very 
different. The company was buying not only skills, but also insight into the local market conditions, 
and the company believes that sub-Saharan Africa has potential for growth (along with other 
emerging markets). The capabilities that the case company was looking for in SA Affiliate were 
high-level technical and scientific capabilities rather than the production capabilities. When it 
comes to initiating new products and services, what really matter are capabilities. When the 
company merged, there was a shift in the responsibilities of top-level skills in South Africa. 
Responsibilities became more specialized in a larger company. 
SA Affiliate cannot always refer back to the headquarters to provide solutions. The distances still 
create time lags where information is hard to convey or knowledge is tacit. SA Affiliate kept its 
R&D capacity after joining the case company; it still performs R&D for dairy products at the 
innovation center formed by the case company in Cape Town. The same was done for baking R&D: 
this aspect of the innovation center was formed by a company run by two New Zealanders, which 
was also bought by the case company. The current innovation center was created by bringing 
together the R&D capacities of these companies. The innovation center is now looking to expand 
further, into meat, breweries and beverages. 
The case company was interested in both SA Affiliate’s in-house skills and skills networks when 
buying the company. SA Affiliate partnered with Stellenbosch University, the University of the 
Western Cape, the University of Wisconson and others. If there is a lot of troubleshooting and analytical 
work to be done, SA Affiliate finds it helpful to work on the project in collaboration with a university. 
 
3.3 How innovation now works in the new subsidiary 
The development of a stabilizer or blend in South Africa takes place through innovation in the 
development division. The recipe is then passed on to the manufacturing arm of the case company. 
Turnaround times for research have slowed down since the takeover because quick decisions cannot 
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be made without first motivating for a project. On the other hand, it can be beneficial for skills 
recruitment to be part of a large company: people are less apprehensive about working with a global 
company than with a smaller private company. However, networks for exchanging knowledge and 
building intellectual property (IP) did not change following the takeover. The case company was 
keen to continue those relationships, especially since they are important for developing products 
specific to local needs. Adapting to local needs is also important for expansion into sub-Saharan 
Africa. 
Collaboration and knowledge exchange with the headquarters is done almost on a monthly basis. 
Previously, when developing a product, SA Affiliate had to start from scratch, but it now has access 
to the global network and can see whether similar products have been developed around the world. 
Having access to this information speeds up the development process substantially. The South 
African subsidiary exchanges knowledge with the regional headquarters, so SA Affiliate reports to 
e.g. Brazil. There is presently a lot of interaction with Brazil for product development. If Brazil 
cannot assist South African operations with a product, then the knowledge base of any of the other 
regions can be exploited. The access to other regions is horizontal, and does not go through the 
Brazilian headquarters. Once a month there are formal reports about developments across all 
centers, but the knowledge base can be accessed whenever the need arises. There are also meetings, 
at least twice a year, of the innovation personnel in South Africa, Brazil and elsewhere. There have 
been numerous cases where IP from South Africa has been used in Brazil. For example, the yogurt 
market in South Africa is well established, and Brazil has often used South African IP to develop 
yogurt products. The IP was developed by SA Affiliate, and now belongs to the case company 
globally. But because the IP was developed in South Africa, the South African subsidiary is the first 
port of call for developing related products.  
Changes and innovations are generally incremental at the ‘shop floor’ level. When new products are 
brought into production, the changes at the shop floor level are generally not too drastic. This is due 
to a combination of the nature of the product and the way engineering and processes are set up to 
keep changes at higher levels in the company. Because of the scale of operations at the case 
company, production techniques cannot easily be interchanged. Previously, SA Affiliate was more 
flexible, and could change production techniques without incurring major capital costs. 
 
3.4 The introduction of a new product or process: how capabilities are upgraded to meet 
the new technology 
South Africa has been used as a pilot project for a new-to-the-world concept developed in the home 
settings of the company, in Scandinavia. The concept was taken to customers, trials were run with 
an application specialist in the plant, and the product was evaluated with a university to predict the 
outcome. If a new product is developed, and there are changes to production in terms of 
engineering, SA Affiliate can go in-house, but more often the customer prefers to use their current 
supplier. Most of the engineering required will then take place with the supplier. For new products, 
the application specialist will make a lot of recommendations for the plant and application. 
Evaluations, such as shelf life, are done with a university. 
When introducing a new product or process, allocating resources and finding sufficient investment 
for projects is the main constraint. The decision to invest in a project is often based on previous 
experience and gut feelings. Developing protocols for a new project takes time. The industry is also 
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constrained by there being many followers and few innovators. Typically, clients will want to see 
evidence of new products working elsewhere in the world before trying to sell them locally. 
 
3.5 Skills 
The major skills constraint is to try to find skilled people with experience. There is little formal 
dairy food science training anymore. It is difficult to hire individuals who understand the practical 
implications as well as the theoretical side. Hiring skilled managers is not a problem; there is an 
adequate supply of managers and project managers. Lower skill levels (supervisory and technical) 
are not in shortage, but it is important to have training programs in place, whether internally or 
externally.  
The South African subsidiary has supervisors for production and quality. Varying degrees of skill 
are required. Shift managers and production managers generally have diplomas. Production 
managers will have a degree. Production is not as specialized as product development in dairy, 
where a production manager will have higher levels of training. Blending is quite a simple 
operation. The value added is in the product development and R&D. 
Turnaround does tend to be quite high at lower skill levels. Typically, people have just come out of 
university and stay on for four or five years’ experience. Being a dynamic company with a lot of 
exposure means that people will often get about four years’ experience before moving on to other 
offers in the industry. The case company also offers a wider variety of career opportunities for 
employees, specialized careers in research, more generalized careers, technical sales or sales, 
whereas there are fewer opportunities in a smaller company. The larger company is much more 
rewarding in terms of career opportunities. 
 
4. Conclusions 
The case company, Agro1, has expanded its GIN into South Africa, allowing SA Affiliate to exploit 
IP from all over the world when introducing new products into sub-Saharan Africa. On the other 
hand, acquiring SA Affiliate offered the case company an opportunity to augment its innovation 
capacity (especially in dairy products) and enter the growing sub-Saharan market. SA Affiliate also 
had existing knowledge networks that the company continues to use. Skills shortages are not a 
major constraint at any of the skill levels, although it is difficult to find skilled personnel with 
experience. The largest constraint to innovation is investment capital for new projects. 
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1. Introduction 
This case study aims at looking more closely into the various ways how a medium sized 
multinational from the German automotive industry, Auto1, has developed its capabilities to 
produce sophisticated products abroad and currently extends its capabilities to tap into hot spots of 
knowledge in emerging economies for innovative activities. Capabilities in the meaning of this case 
study mainly refer to the spatial distribution and local development of human resources within the 
company and their purposive development by strategic action. The case study attempts to match 
two views on recent changes in skills and knowledge within the global network of the 
multinationals’ subsidiaries. One perspective is from the headquarters on long-term strategies, the 
company’s self-understanding and recent learning in organization of innovative activities. The 
second perspective is from the global South, from the managers of a subsidiary, in this case from 
South Africa. Both of these perspectives are based on personal interviews with managers from the 
company at each location. As multinationals tap into a heterogeneity of locations abroad in 
allocating production and innovation to emerging economies, this matching applies more to 
production than to R&D. Nevertheless, the case study will also look at another location adding new 
capabilities to the company in innovation, i.e. Pune/India. While the South African location cannot 
be considered as a hot spot of knowledge as the term is currently used in the literature, Pune 
certainly has emerged as a hot spot both in automobile production and software technology, 
recently (Kuwajima, H. et al. 2010, MIDC 2010). 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 introduces Auto1 and its main technological capabilities. 
Section 2 discusses the various forms of being embedded in the home country society from which 
the company benefits both in productivity and innovativeness. Section 3 and 4 draw on a recent 
difference seen by scholars dealing with global knowledge networks in multinational companies 
and the opportunities of being embedded in hot and blind spots of knowledge in the global economy 
(e.g., Manning et al. 2010). In section 3, taking a blind spot as an example, we analyse skill and 
knowledge formation at a single company production site in South Africa. From the different plants 
the company has in South Africa we chose the largest plant which mainly produces parts for 
exportation to Europe and other continents. This site is different from most other sites abroad as the 
company generally assembles its products nearby their OEM clients in a follow-the-client strategy. 
Section 4 will look at a recent investment of the company at a hot spot, e.g. Pune in India, where 
increasingly R&D services to the home R&D centre and other locations are allocated. Section 5 will 
draw some conclusions upon the kind of global innovation network and the role of human capital 
therein, in search of explaining the global shifts in the company’s organisation by push and pull 
factors. 
 
 
2. The company 
Auto1 is typical of many German automotive suppliers having emerged from a small scale crafts 
shop to a large, international producer within more than one century. The company entered the 
automotive sector during the 1930s in producing heatings and sound absorbers. As one of the 
Volkswagen suppliers from the beginnings the company grew up in the rhythm of the growth of the 
German automobile industry after 1945. The current main product line for the passenger car sector, 
the commercial vehicle sector and the aftermarkets was added at the beginnings of the 1970s. The 
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1980s laid the ground for the current position as a market leader in technology and a European 
company. A R&D centre at the headquarter’s site was established and the company started an 
extensive internationalisation process in sales agencies and production plants abroad. During the 
1990s, the company further extended its activities to Eastern Europe, South Africa and the US and 
became a world technology leader for special parts in diesel engine technology for passenger cars. 
In the first decade of the 21st century, a second technology centre was established in the US in 
2002, and the company became fully global in opening sales offices, production plants and small 
R&D offices in India, China, Russia, Korea, and Japan. Additionally, the company extended its 
technological capabilities in system’s integration and electrical products for busses by taking over 
some German companies by the end of the decade. Just recently, a joint venture with other large 
German automobile suppliers has been created for the development and production of similar 
products for non-road vehicles (construction and agricultural machinery, commercial vehicles). 
Furthermore, the company recently took over another small company for lightweigth design and 
customized volume production. As a result, the company steadily increased its capabilities in new 
technologies related to its core competences and increasingly added capabilities in automobile 
electronics and alternative energy products. Nowadays, the company claims to be “the only 
producer of a complete product portfolio on all alternative powertrain technologies in what 
concerns the heating”, i.e. one of their core competences (Annual report 2009). The company sells 
to original equipment markets and aftermarkets in all these product lines. It is present in more than 
20 countries across the world, mostly through customized production, sales and service subsidiaries.  
This paper will look more closely to the largest production line of the company. Although the 
company has started with products for passenger cars – and still is a major producer of these today – 
development and production of similar products for heavy commercial vehicles is more challenging 
(and probably more profitable). Production for passenger cars is subject to standardisation, 
principles of mass production, and dependent from the model cycles of the OEMs. As a 
consequence, product lines have a lifetime of 4 to 5 years, according to the passenger car OEMs 
product cycles, during which only minor technological adjustments are required. Technical 
requirements to products for commercial vehicles are more challenging, due to the long running 
period and more severe running conditions of trucks and due to strict environmental regulations at 
the US and European markets. 
The company grew up to a medium-sized international firm of about 5,600 employees, with an 
annual turnover of about 1.9 Billion € in 2010. Notwithstanding the fast globalisation process 
during the recent decades, the company still generates 76% of its gross income in Europe, 19% in 
America, and only 5% in Asia, Africa and Australia. The company continues to be family based, 
recently two family members of the 5th generation entered the board. This is what is called a typical 
“Mittelstand” firm in Germany being present at the world markets but strongly based in Germany 
(and Europe). As will be seen in the following, the company sticks to “local” resources and 
relationships in innovation activities and is rather reluctant in “globalizing” innovation.  
From this brief description of the technological competences of the firm two conclusions can be 
drawn concerning human resources development. First, as products have become so complex and 
production aims at high quality, the requirements to the workers and the supervisors at the shop-
floor matter seriously. This translates into a high esteem of the German system of vocational 
training and causes a problem in countries which do not offer a sophisticated system of technical 
education and training. Second, innovation created in the R&D centres and its implementation at the 
factories refers increasingly to the capacities of the engineers and their internal and external 
knowledge linkages. 
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3. A strong company’s home embeddedness 
The company is strongly embedded into its regional environment. This applies to skill formation 
and appointments at each level of qualified labour force. As the company considers its products 
rather complex and, consequently, asks for a qualified labour force at the shop floor, it profits from 
the German dual vocational education and training system which provides both a broadly qualified 
labour force at the shop floor and broadly qualified supervisors (the masters). The company takes 
care about getting apprentices of satisfying qualification and in sufficient number, for example in 
offering short term internships to schoolboys and schoolgirls or sponsoring teaching material at 
schools. So, in Germany, particularly at the headquarter’s and the central production sites, the 
company tries to come into early contact with young people at school in order to raise children’s 
interest in technical education. The company offers a fairly large number of apprenticeships which 
even increased during the crisis in 2008, promotes skilled persons to get the supervisor certificate 
(“Meisterbrief”, master certificate) and to continue studying at the nearby “dual” university for an 
engineer’s degree. This “dual” university is a new form of university for applied sciences in 
Germany, at which companies can send part-time student-employees and have an influence on the 
curricula in terms of requirements to their specific technological practices.  
The strong home base in labour force qualifications may be one reason why the company still has 
the bulk of its production in Germany. Another is that technological capabilities lay, at first, in the 
production of the main parts of the components, and, second, in the assembly of these parts to 
components to be delivered just-in-time to an OEM’s assembly plant. As a consequence, parts 
production may remain concentrated in Germany while components assembly may be 
internationalized or even “globalized”. The global centre of production planning for the commercial 
vehicle markets – and the largest plant for these products – is located in another state in Southern 
Germany. Here, nearly one third of the 1,200 persons employed are (technical) office staff, many of 
them at the engineers and supervisors level (technician, foreman). Assembly plants for components 
are different as they generally are small plants, sometimes with less than 20 employees, where the 
manager is the only engineer pursuing all tasks of production planning and production supervision. 
During the recent crisis, the home base of the company was even strengthened. Using the new 
German labour market regulations, i.e. subsidized short labour regulation, the company rather saved 
its labour force (only -5.7%), mainly in reducing the number of temporary staff. It was the explicit 
aim and policy of the company, to “preserve the proven permanent staff as far as possible” (Annual 
Report 2009, 14). 
R&D is even more concentrated geographically. Basic research and development is only pursued at 
the headquarter’s R&D centre in Germany. Its personnel was about 3.8% of the total labour force of 
the company and the R&D expenditures about 5.9 % of the annual turnover (in 2009). The latter 
figure is a statistical artifact as the company faced a tremendous decrease in turnover from 2008 to 
2009 (by 40%) but reduced the R&D budget only by 4% (R&D expenditure in 2008 3.7% of annual 
turnover).  
This R&D rate makes clear that the company is not a high technology firm according to the 
innovation literature, as many other German automotive suppliers. It seems to be in contradiction to 
the fact, that the company is world market leader in some technologies. This can be explained by 
the particular competences of a system supplier who has the capacities to combine different 
technologies, among them high tech. For example, the company has formed four teams on different 
technologies – so-called “competence centres” – on fixing technologies, welding, automation, and 
canning and jig making. These teams form the organisational backbone of the company’s 
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technological knowledge. They collaborate within the R&D department and across to production 
planning locally and globally. 
Furthermore, the company has maintained a strict control on R&D processes through allocating new 
product development mainly to the German R&D centre. It was only fifteen years after this has 
been established that the company erected another technical centre at the North American continent, 
nearby Detroit, which is said to be a nearby “independent” R&D centre. However, when it recently 
came to the development of a new system for an US heavy truck OEM, according to new 
requirements on environmental protection (EPA 10), which was rather new for the world, the 
American technical centre had to collaborate strongly with the German R&D centre. Furthermore, 
the company has established several R&D offices in main markets across the world, such as in 
Europe (UK, France, Italy, Russia), Asia (South Korea, China) and, recently, in Brazil. As a 
consequence, the company has a strong multinational but not a global strategy for R&D 
organisation. 
Very recently, the company opened another, yet small R&D centre at Pune/India which is one of the 
main automotive production regions in India, and simultaneously established particular 
relationships to a local engineering services provider for outsourcing some design activities.  
In innovation management, the company recently launched a new tool which applies for all 
innovative procedures at the main R&D centre. A phasing of innovation procedures from a first step 
to getting impulses from everywhere possible to ongoing evaluation and selection, modelling and, 
finally, transferring the innovative idea to the customer advisory services department for acquisition 
(and final steps of customized production) has been introduced, mainly based on own reflections 
and discussions. Once again, it could be claimed that the company behaves like German Mittelstand 
does, i.e. preferring in-house development. For sure, the first step of this innovation management 
procedure takes full advantage of broad information on technological issues available in Germany, 
such as information from clients, conferences, journals, and more or less nearby universities. The 
company hosts a number of diploma and PhD students from (mostly technical) universities for 
writing their theses on a technical problem area the company is interested in. Linkages to 
universities are specific to the product of the main plants which means that they mostly are “local” 
according to the location of the plant. At each location in Germany, the company can link up with 
nearby technical universities. Obviously, the learning capacity of the company in terms of 
innovation is largely based on the main R&D site in Germany and its regional external relations. It 
seems that there is a clear centre-periphery gradient between basic innovation at home and 
customized applications to “local” markets – which mostly means OEMs at their market – abroad.  
As a result, the company can be described as a strongly home-based player at world markets. R&D 
is strongly concentrated at the headquarters which is clearly shown by employment figures in R&D. 
The German R&D centre has more than 300 employees and the US-based R&D centre 60 
employees while 8 further R&D offices across the world sum up to 33 employees in R&D. The 
governance of global production is similarly concentrated as global production planning is allocated 
to the German primary plants according to the product lines.  
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4. Improving the capabilities at a blind spot of parts production in 
South Africa 
South Africa was one of the first investment locations when the company started to go beyond 
Europe and the first in an emerging economy. It seems that the company followed their German 
clients in the premium segment who have produced in South Africa for a rather long time (see 
Barnes/Kaplinsky 2000). But additionally to small component assembly plants near the OEMs – 
what could have been expected – the company invested into a large parts production plant at a 
different location where availability of a pool of skills at low costs matched with proximity to some 
OEM assemblers. 
This South African subsidiary was the first in this product line in South Africa. With about 1,000 
persons, it is also the largest in the country, for the simple reason that most other South African 
plants do components assembly. The company’s South African component assembly plants employ 
less than 50 persons each. 
The sector in South Africa has grown rapidly in scale for two key reasons. The first of these – but a 
minor one – is proximity to platinum resources and availability of several suppliers from the 
chemical industry. Of far more significance is the Motor Investment Development Plan (MIDP) 
which was launched by the South African government in the mid-1990s (Barnes/Kaplinsky 2000, 
799). Under the terms of this programme, OEMs in South Africa and probably some major 
components assemblers earned an import rebate (e.g. on other components) if they considerably 
sourced locally. The MIDP was extended until 2012. It has now been replaced by the Automotive 
Production and Development Programme (APDP), which offers similar levels of benefits to firms, 
but with a greater emphasis on investment and production volume than on import/export 
complementation. The company’s products are rather expensive components of the car which must 
be assembled locally but need importation of very different parts. Hence, investment in some parts 
production both for the domestic market and exportation was and still is rather profitable. As parts 
production is subject to scale economies, production for the domestic market is very small. 98% of 
their output is exported, either to Europe or to Asian countries such as China, India, Korea or Japan. 
Domestically, the subsidiary supplies indirectly, through the assembly plants, to the local German 
premium OEMs such as Daimler or BMW. 
As a consequence, the plant is under particular pressure from the company. As direct delivery times 
to OEMs in export markets would be too long the plant focuses on standard products with a certain 
value added. It benefits from rather low labour costs but has to achieve high quality objectives as 
the distance to customers does not allow for a retouch. Aspects of process and quality control figure 
high in running the plant. It seems that the management is quite successful herein, as it claims that 
reject rates are the lowest in the company; in some cases also scrap rates are lower. The subsidiary 
benefits more from productivity improvements than low wages. Hence, locally designed 
improvements are mostly in processes, not products. 
Under these circumstances, skills and skill upgrading are crucial for the long-run survival of the 
subsidiary. It is, however, the responsibility of local managers to appoint and to train the local 
labour force. As a consequence, the management in the South African plant mentioned above 
appoints operators at the shopfloor only if they have a matric certificate, i.e. if they have passed 
twelve years at school. Even this qualification is considered rather low and new operators only 
become productive after in-house training. The organisation of this training is a local task. 
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Operators have to pass a generic induction process on basic work principles (such as “Six Sigma”) 
and the particular technology of the product and get further training on the job.  
Skills availability at higher levels in the South African plant is problematic. At the supervisory 
level, the South African subsidiary seems to face some shortages, in particular concerning qualified 
electricians. Headhunting is a problem, as there are several firms competing for a small pool of 
skills. The subsidiary draws on internships of students from the nearby Nelson Mandela 
Metropolitan University (NMMU) for appointments. At the engineer’s level, search for qualified 
engineers is difficult, too, particularly in process and industrial engineering. Engineers are only 
appointed if they have already work experiences.  
When a new product is launched a task force from the German headquarter offers short-time 
training at the plant. In fact, the company has established “global support teams” whose members 
travel around the world for training into new product lines and for removing serious mechanical 
faults. The latter is due to the fact that qualification requirements have been shifted from the worker 
to sophisticated equipment (automated machinery) in order to enable low skilled workers to handle 
the machinery.  
It comes with no surprise that the South African subsidiary only plays a limited role in the 
company’s global innovation network. There is, in general, very little product innovation and 
limited process innovation. The South African subsidiary has contributed to process improvements 
in two of the four areas of technical competence which have been defined as core competences by 
the headquarters. This was done in co-operation with local suppliers. However, innovation pushes 
generally come from the headquarter, both in product and process innovation. The company has 
established global support teams for technological improvements with local engineers forming part 
of the teams. These engineers generally get further training by short term travels to the 
headquarters. 
 
 
5. How to integrate a hot spot into the company’s R&D system?  
The case of Pune, India 
Rather recently, the company started production at Pune, India, and then established a small R&D 
centre of less than 10 engineers nearby. It is nevertheless larger than those R&D offices in, e.g., 
Japan, Korea, Russia or Brazil which mainly function as observing post and sales office in these 
markets. Engineers in the Pune R&D centre need to have competences in different technological 
areas related to the products as they are responsible for adapting products to local market 
conditions. 
At the same time, however, the company established another kind of relationship to Pune in design 
activities. The company invested into close relationships to an Indian engineering service provider 
in order to outsource and offshore some low valued engineering tasks in design. These are usually 
standardized work tasks for engineers forming part of a broader design process based on (non-
standardizable) engineer’s experience. Standardization here means a well defined problem and 
clear-cut definition of work loads. Examples for low valued engineering tasks are calculations, re-
drawings and simple design. The company tries to extend this outsourcing/offshoring for reducing 
R&D costs and in case of bottlenecks at the German R&D centre. At first sight, it seems easy to 
relocate these tasks abroad, as part of an internal division of labour in R&D. However, 
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communication among engineers in this field of technology across borders, cultures and languages 
needs careful organisation. The company chose the way of selecting and training boundary spanners 
from the host country. Engineers from India were appointed and stayed for a year or more at the 
headquarters in Germany for collaborating on different projects in the R&D department. So, they 
experienced “learning by doing”, considered necessary by the company. As one manager pointed 
out: “we are going to India via an Indian. Direct communication of a German with counterparts in 
India is less effective compared to an Indian in Germany who tells his Indian counterpart what is 
required. Only this works”. As the company still needs only a few boundary spanners to India, these 
engineers simply form part of a project team at the headquarters. There is no general programme to 
train boundary spanning as some other German automotive suppliers start to implement. The 
company, however, increasingly trusted in the capacities of the Indian service provider to send 
qualified engineers to Germany.  
Hence, the company has appointed a number of engineers from those foreign countries which are 
seen as strategic market areas (for the future). These engineers either continuously stay at the 
headquarter in order to maintain the day-to-day contact to foreign subsidiaries or pass various 
departments at the headquarter for a year or two before they are returning into their home country 
where they act as “receiver” (of the company’s orders) und “transmitter” (to their own staff abroad). 
The procedure applies to India, Russia, and China, i.e. very large future markets in automobile 
production. In order for learning processes through direct interaction to be effective, also the 
engineers at headquarter had to be prepared, e.g. in language and intercultural skills. 
While the instrument of selecting and training boundary spanners may be – and increasingly is – 
implemented for all R&D offices in emerging economies, outsourcing to India may have a special 
and more far-reaching implication. We might be observing the beginning of a new international 
division of labour in product development, new to the company and probably rather new to the 
market. We see no reason why the capabilities of the company’s own R&D centre in India could not 
be matched with those of the engineering service provider for relocating more sophisticated R&D 
tasks in the long run, all the more as they are geographically close to each other.  
 
 
6. Conclusions: in what sense global innovation networks of the 
company? 
It has become clear from the previous that Auto1 is a global market leader in different automotive 
systems which is present at all continents (except Australia). Although not a high tech firm, it 
continuously develops new products which have a long life cycle. Innovation impulses for new 
products mainly come from the market, i.e. OEMs and their R&D centres. Thus, proximity to the 
OEMs headquarters and central R&D labs matters most. Most of this is based in Europe. If 
innovation impulses come from abroad, it is through the demand of powerful customers (such as in 
the US). The company widens its technological experience into new fields, particularly by recent 
takeovers and by a joint venture with large system suppliers in Germany.  
Hence, the company is a strong case of a home-based player who carefully controls innovative 
activities from its headquarters. Investment in production facilities abroad is mainly driven by the 
pull of demand from the market, i.e. large OEMs most of which are clients in the home country Germany 
since long. Another yet weaker and more exceptional pull seems to come from state incentives as with the 
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example of the South African MIDP giving rise to the particular case of relocation of parts production to a 
non-European location. R&D is even more concentrated in Germany as most of the R&D subsidiaries across 
the world are simple observing and marketing posts.  
Interestingly, the company has started to outsource and offshore some standardized activities in 
engineering to Pune in India. By this, the company follows the example of some other very large 
German automotive suppliers who already have relocated engineering to own subsidiaries in Pune. 
The current outsourcing of simple engineering tasks to an Indian engineering service provider meets 
two targets, i.e. capacity enlargement of R&D when bottlenecks appear at home, and cost reduction 
of standardized engineering work. To reduce the difficulties and costs of cross-border 
communication the company benefits from a policy to invest in inpatriates, i.e. engineers from the 
host country, as boundary spanners. However, the company still is in a learning phase how to 
govern innovative activities across the organisational, geographical and cultural borders and might 
be very cautious in allocating more sophisticated tasks to engineers in emerging economies. Hence, 
there is innovation and there are innovation networks in the company but they are not global.  
 
7. Sources 
Annual Reports 2009, 2010 
Company documents 
Interviews with managers from the company in Germany and South Africa. 
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1. Introduction: the analytical context1 
Global Innovation Networks (GINs) are global networks in which some knowledge-intensive 
activities are based in developing countries. They differ qualitatively from the better known global 
production networks (GPNs) where Northern MNEs traditionally control the key technological 
assets, while outsourcing the supply of parts and components or assembly to contract 
manufacturers.  
GINs have attracted scholarly attention given their importance to understand the innovation process 
and therefore for their implication for innovation policy, both in northern and southern countries. 
Literature has specifically focused on the identifying the inducement mechanisms driving the 
formation of GINs and on assessing the impacts of GINs on the host countries.  
Concerning the inducement mechanisms, research has identified a set of "centripetal forces" (which 
induce the firms to centralize the R&D activities in the headquarters) and “centrifugal forces” (that 
work towards the dispersion of R&D activities across different locations beyond the home country). 
The "centripetal forces" include: 1) the need to protect firm- specific technology as relocation of 
R&D that could lead to unwanted R&D leakage (Rugman, 1981). Steele (1975) argued that, firm 
specific technical advantages tend to evolve from and mirror home market conditions and that the 
need to retain and strengthen such advantages necessitates continued close contact with the 
domestic market. 2) the significance of scale economies in R&D and the difficulties in achieving 
minimum scale in case of decentralized laboratories2. 3) Some of the pioneering studies also found 
the high cost of co-ordination and control (Vernon, 1974) as a centripetal force. The "centrifugal 
forces" include: 1) demand-oriented factors, that emanate from the need to be nearer to the export 
market. Often, the transfer of manufacturing technologies from the parent firm calls for substantial 
adaptation to suit the local market conditions.  In such a context, firms resort to the setting up of 
local R&D units oriented towards adaptive R&D. This happens particularly in countries with a large 
domestic markets or where required/induced by specific government regulations.  2) supply-side 
factors, and specifically the access to scientific and technological skills and infrastructures that are 
available in the host countries at more advantageous terms than in the home market.    
The unprecedented increase in the pace at which GINs are being formed (UNCTAD 1995; Ernst 
2011) suggests that certain factors are changing the balance of centripetal and centrifugal forces in 
favour of centrifugal forces (Albuquerque et al 2011), thereby compelling firms to locate their R&D 
activities outside their home countries. The improvement in the information communication 
infrastructure (lessening coordination and administration costs); the heightened risk and complexity 
in developing technology along with shorter product life cycle;  and the policies that liberalized 
trade and investments may all have played a role. Key importance has been attributed to the 
growing availability (at a lower cost) of human capital and skilled manpower in southern countries 
such as China and India, particularly in a context signed by the escalation in R&D costs at home 
and intense competition in domestic and global markets (Stembridge, 2007).  
 
                                                     
1
 This paper is based on the inputs provided by the INGINEUS research team in Sweden and China 
2
 Empirical evidence on the adverse effect of scale economies on  internationalization however, remained inconclusive 
(Granstrand et.al. 1997). 
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The relocation of R&D activities by the MNEs in a globalised world is seen as a strategy to exploit 
regions’ differential advantage in production and in R&D (Cantwell 1995). As a consequence the 
process of GIN formation is often considered as a mutually beneficial game wherein both 
participating parties tend to benefit. Developing countries increasingly welcome, and in a sense 
compete among each other to participate in, GINs given its potential for building and sustain their 
innovation capabilities.  
This paper analyses the relationship between the innovation and business strategy of a northern ICT 
multinational enterprise (MNE), and human capital in the host northern and southern countries. It 
studies the implications of this relationship for the constitution of global innovation networks 
(GINs) and for their impacts on the host countries. A key issue concerns the difference between 
competence and capability. While competence (akin to invention) indicates the potential, capability 
(akin to innovation), indicates the actual scenario (Cozzens and Kaplinski 2010). Unravelling the 
innovation strategy of the firm against the backdrop of the availability of competences, the paper 
intends to analyse how and to what extent the presence of the MNE may contribute to turn available 
competence into innovation capability in the host countries.   
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the 
competencies as manifested the supply of skilled manpower in a northern (Sweden) and two 
southern (India and China) host countries wherein the company operates. Section 3 presents 
innovation strategy of the firm and locates the nexus between globalisation of innovation, 
competence and capability building in the host countries. Section 4 draws the conclusions.  
 
 
2. Competencies for innovation in the host countries 
In the discussion that follows, we deal with the availability of skilled manpower as an indicator of 
competence (while transforming it into actual capability will depend on a host of factors).   
 
2.1 (Higher) education in Sweden 
Sweden higher education system includes three types of Higher Education Institutes (HEIs).  
Universities (Table 1) and University Colleges are the most important. The University Colleges 
provide degrees at graduate (University diplomas and Bachelor degrees) and post-graduate level 
(Master and Doctorate). Contrary to Universities, most of the Colleges specialize in just one 
academic discipline (Chaminade 2011). 
 
Table 1: Number of students enrolled in the 10 largest Swedish Universities (2008). 
University Number of Students FTE 
Lund University 24600 
Gothenburg University 24100 
Stockholm University 22400 
Uppsala University 19900 
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Linköping Univ. 16900 
Umeå 15600 
Linnaeus Univ. 15000 
Royal Institute of Technology 
(KTH) 
11700 
Chalmers 8471 
Source: Swedish Higher Education Authority (2009) 
 
The R&D system is completed by a number of R&D institutes. While relatively small when 
compared to those in other OECD countries (the bulk of public R&D is routed through the 
University system), they play critical role in different industries3. ì 
The tertiary education in Sweden at present could be divided into three phases: Bachelor, Master 
and PhD. Available data indicate that the total number of degrees awarded has increased steadily 
until early 2000s. It has then levelled off and decreased after 2005 (particularly because of the 
number of degrees to the first and second phases. The number of doctorates has slightly increased - 
see Fig 1).  
 
Fig:1: Number of degrees awarded in tertiary education 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: SNAHE (2010) quoted in Chaminade 2011 
 
The decline in the number of students enrolled in tertiary education in Sweden, if structural and 
long-term, may have an impact on the availability of researchers and R&D personal in the Swedish 
innovation system (Fig. 2) and therefore on the innovation capability of the country.  
                                                     
3
 Some of the most important ones are the Swedish Defense Research Agency (FOI) (aprox. 1250 employees), the 
industrial research institutes (jointly owned by the government and industrial associations, employing aprox. 2100 
employees) and other government research institutes and agencies like the Swedish Institute for Infectious Disease 
Control or the National Institute for Working Life, employing aprox. 430 researchers full time (VINNOVA, 2006). 
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Fig 2: Total Researchers and R&D personnel per thousand total employment 2004/2008). 
 
 
2.2. (Higher) education in China 
Since the formation of People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, the structure of China’s 
education system underwent major changes with the objective of ensuring equal opportunities for 
all. As a result, there has been significant increase in the enrolment in education. To be more 
specific, in 1949 the net enrollment ratio of school aged children was only about 20% (and about 
80% of the Chinese population remained illiterate) and by 2007 it increased 99.5%. Equally 
remarkable has been China's achievements4 in the sphere of higher education.  
China's tertiary education is currently articulated in three types of HEIs: universities 
(multidisciplinary HEIs performing education programs and research in multiple domains of 
knowledge), academies (focused on particular areas, such as natural sciences, social sciences, 
agriculture etc), and “institutes” (providing education services in certain narrow areas, such as 
Chinese traditional medicine, music etc). Some key universities and institutes are directly under the 
Ministry of Education or other state ministries, while the others are usually under local government.  
As per the latest available data, China has 1867 HEIs, of which 85 per cent (1591) are state-owned 
and the remaining private (Indicators of Education in China, 2007). Out of the total HEIs, 40% are 
in natural sciences & technology, and only 20% in social sciences (art, political science and law, 
finance & economics, language & literature), indicating the high priority being attached to science 
& technology education. Most of students (25.29 million, equivalent to 93.6% of total students) are 
                                                     
4
 In May 1998, China’s former president, Jiang Zemin, put forward the famous “985 Program” at the 100th anniversary 
celebration of Peking University, which means China will develop a number of world-class universities in order to 
achieve modernization. By now, there are 34 universities including Tsinghua University and Peking University on the 
“985 Program” list. 
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enrolled in government-owned institutes. The Gross Enrolment Ratio (GER) in higher education is 
at 23%, among the highest in the developing world 
Research institutes are an important source of skilled manpower at post-graduate level. The 
Graduate University of Chinese Academy of Sciences (GUCAS) is known as the biggest post-
graduate education institutions in the world. By now, GUCAS has more than 30 thousand enrolled 
post-graduate students (accounting for for more than 3% of all the post-graduate students in China. 
In particular, GUCAS PhD students account for more than 8% of all PhD students in China). 
Secondary vocational education5 is an important source of skilled manpower for blue collar jobs. 
During the rapid manufacturing-led economic growth of 1980s and 1990s, the enrolment rate for 
secondary vocational education was higher than for senior general education and higher education.  
More recently, however, enrolment for secondary vocational education has been declining, mainly 
because of growing demand for highly skilled manpower induced inter alia by the globalization of 
R&D activities by MNEs and industrial and technological upgrading within the country. Overall, 
there has been a shift from secondary vocation education towards higher education.6  
Overall, the performance of China in the sphere of higher education is impressive. 
 
2.3 (Higher) education in India 
Indian experience is comparable to that of China in many respects but not as impressive in terms of 
the ultimate outcome. From the colonial rulers India inherited a stagnant economy, poorly endowed 
with human capital, and with illiteracy rate at 85%. Given the high rate of illiteracy at the time of 
independence and the imperative of skilled manpower to achieve the desired economic 
transformation (Government of India 1958), the planners adopted a strategy where both primary 
education and higher education were promoted with an equal vigour.  
The Science Policy Resolution (GoI 1958), which laid the foundation of India’s national system of 
innovation, noted that India’s enormous resource - manpower- would become an asset in the 
modern world only when trained and educated. This stand led to substantial investment in 
education, to address both the issue of widespread illiteracy (primary and secondary level) and the 
growing demand for highly skilled manpower for a growing economy (higher education level).  
These initiatives resulted in a remarkable increase in the Gross Enrolment Ratio (GER)7 at the elementary 
level over time from about 32 per cent in 1950-51 to nearly 95 per cent in 2005-06. However as per the latest 
statistics available (2005-06) the GER at secondary and senior secondary level is at a much lower 
level  of 52.2 per cent and 48.5 per cent respectively (GOI Ministry of Human Resource 
Development 2008).  
The higher education system is basically a three tier one with each level producing different levels 
of output. The first tier includes the premier institutions in the country whose main objective is to 
                                                     
5
 This consists of Regular Specialized Secondary Schools, Adult Schools, Vocational High Schools and Skilled 
Workers Schools 
6
 Apart from the Government institutions there is a growing number of private schools in China. In 2007, there are 
95200 private schools in China ranging from preschool education to higher education as well as vocational school. 
7 GER is the total enrolment of pupil in grade or cycle or level of education, regardless of age, expressed as 
percentage of the corresponding eligible official age-group population in a given school year. 
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produce world-class manpower and undertake research. These institutions are established by the 
Parliament/state legislatures as "Institutions of National Importance" and  funded by the Ministry of 
Human Resource Development under the Central Government. Important institutions in this list are 
the Indian Institutes of Technology.  The second level of institutions come under the university 
education systems that consists of over 350 universities. Universities can either be established by an 
Act of Parliament or by the state legislatures8.  The university system in India operates through 
teaching and research departments within as well as through affiliated colleges. These affiliated 
colleges are of three type viz., government run, government aided and private self-financed. The 
third level includes the so-called "deemed to be universities" (institutions that are conferred the 
status of a university because of their long tradition of teaching, or specialisation and excellence in 
a particular area of knowledge). Universities, Institutes of National Importance and deemed to be 
Universities are all degree-granting institutions. 
The growth of higher education in India has been phenomenal. In 1950-51 India had only 27 
universities, 370 colleges for general education and 208 colleges for professional education (eg 
engineering, medicine).  By 2005-06, the number of colleges for general education increased to 
over 11 thousand, professional colleges to 5284 and that of universities/ deemed universities and 
institutes of national importance to 350. It may be noted that the number of professional colleges 
has recently been growing much faster than of the other HEIs. Specifically, the number of 
professional colleges increased by a just over four times over 1950-1990, and by almost six times 
during the 15 years (1990-2005). On the contrary, the number of colleges for general education 
increased more than 13 fold over the 1950-90 and only 2.5 times during the last 15 years. Thus it 
appears that there has been a marked shift since 1991 from general education to professional 
courses like engineering (mostly at the instance of the private sector).  This could be attributed 
mainly to the growing demand for such manpower from the industrial and service sectors (like IT 
and software, both from the local and foreign firms).  
Overall, the level of enrolment in Universities increased from 0.15 million in 1947 to 11.7 million 
in 2005 (of which 13 percent were in University Departments and the rest in affiliated colleges 
MHRD 2007).  While this performance appears impressive in absolute terms, is far from what 
achieved by China (at least in quantitative terms). Section 2.4 before provide a comparative 
perspective on the two countries.     
 
2.4 Competencies for innovation in China and India - a comparative perspective 
Table 2 and Table 3 show the Barro-Lee indexes on educational attainment for, respectively, India 
and China over 2005-2010.  
 
In India (Table 2) the proportion of population without no schooling above the age of 25 marginally 
declined from 46.8% in 2005 to 42.2% in 2010. Over the same period the percentage of population 
over 25 that completed tertiary education increased marginally from 3.4% in 2005 to 3.8% in 2010. 
                                                     
8
 Those established by the Act of Parliament are called the Central universities and the ones set up by the state 
legislatures are called state universities. Some higher education institutions are granted the ‘deemed to be 
university’ status by the central government through gazette notifications. 
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Similarly, the increase in the average years of schooling was also minimal (from 3.9 to 4.4). 
Overall, at least according to the Barro-Lee measures, India is still far from being a country with a 
large proportion of highly skilled manpower.   
 
Table 2: India: Barro Lee Index on educational attainment for total population 2005 – 2010 
Highest level attained 
Primary Secondary Tertiary 
Tot Comp Total Comp Total Comp 
Year Age Group 
N
o
 
 
sc
ho
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g 
(% of population aged 15 and over) 
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ag
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Y
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f  
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o
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g 
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n
 
 
 
(10
00
s) 
                        
2005 15 19 2.6 32.5 32.5 63.9 0.4 1.0 0.1 6.902 110072 
2005 20 24 23.5 20.9 20.9 47.6 1.2 8.0 3.0 6.083 101182 
2005 25 29 28.6 20.6 20.6 44.1 1.1 6.7 3.9 5.611 87787 
2005 30 34 40.6 16.4 16.4 37.3 0.9 5.7 3.4 4.635 82999 
2005 35 39 42.2 18.3 18.3 33.9 0.8 5.6 3.7 4.453 74572 
2005 40 44 47.9 19.6 19.4 26.3 0.7 6.2 4.1 3.982 65646 
2005 25 + 46.8 18.8 15.4 29.1 0.8 5.3 3.4 3.975 538366 
2005 15 + 37.2 21.1 18.4 36.7 0.9 5.1 2.7 4.683 749620 
                        
2010 15 19 5.2 22.8 22.8 70.3 0.5 1.6 0.2 7.021 115383 
2010 20 24 9.0 28.6 28.6 52.8 1.3 9.5 3.5 7.114 109275 
2010 25 29 23.5 20.9 20.9 47.6 1.2 8.0 4.7 6.116 100009 
2010 30 34 28.6 20.6 20.6 44.1 1.1 6.7 3.9 5.613 86338 
2010 35 39 40.6 16.4 16.4 37.3 0.9 5.7 3.8 4.643 81433 
2010 40 44 42.2 18.3 18.3 33.9 0.8 5.6 3.7 4.453 73015 
2010 25 + 42.2 19.1 16.6 32.8 0.9 5.9 3.8 4.400 604417 
2010 15 + 32.7 20.9 18.9 40.7 0.9 5.8 3.1 5.119 829075 
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In China, the picture emerging is much more impressive.  In 2010, the percentage of population 
without schooling in China (Table 3) is much lower than in India (Table 2) across all age groups; 
the number of years schooling is higher (particularly for young cohorts); and the proportion of 
people in the age group 15-25 that completed tertiary education is 11.8% (Table 3) and only 3.7% 
in India (Table 2).  
Overall, there seem to be a significant difference between India and China in terms of higher 
education outcomes. In this context, India seems to show a significant relative skill deficit 
(especially when considered in the context of the two digit growth rate that it is aspiring for). This 
implies that the commonly made statement that "India and China are countries with abundant 
supply of skilled manpower" has to be viewed with sufficient caution.  According to current 
literature, the observed high “relative skill scarcity” in India is bound to have its impact on the firms 
(both MNEs and Local) operating in India.  The case-study intends to shed some light on this issue.  
 
Table 3: China: Barro Lee index on educational attainment for total population 2005 – 2010 
Highest level attained 
Primary Secondary Tertiary 
Tot Comp Tot Comp Tot Comp 
Year Age Group 
N
o
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o
lin
g 
(% of population aged 15 and over) 
A
v
er
ag
e 
 
 
Y
ea
rs
 
o
f  
sc
ho
o
lin
g 
Population  
 (1000s) 
2005 15 19 0.0 
11.
1 8.6 79.9 73.7 9.0 1.3 9.872 117234 
2005 20 24 0.1 9.3 5.9 75.5 75.5 15.2 5.6 10.311 100115 
2005 25 29 1.7 
17.
2 10.9 72.5 72.5 8.6 5.0 9.485 97360 
2005 30 34 2.3 
24.
0 15.1 67.0 67.0 6.7 4.0 8.754 119970 
2005 35 39 2.8 
29.
1 18.2 62.5 62.5 5.5 3.7 8.410 125373 
2005 40 44 3.3 
25.
2 15.7 66.1 52.2 5.4 3.6 8.279 103573 
                        
2010 15 19 0.1 0.0 0.0 85.8 79.1 14.1 2.0 11.111 101995 
2010 20 24 0.1 6.6 4.2 67.2 67.2 26.0 9.6 10.780 116599 
2010 25 29 0.1 9.3 5.9 75.5 75.5 15.2 8.8 10.374 99322 
2010 30 34 1.7 
17.
2 10.9 72.5 72.5 8.6 5.1 9.487 96523 
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2010 35 39 2.3 
24.
0 15.1 67.0 67.0 6.7 4.5 8.764 118961 
2010 40 44 2.8 
29.
1 18.2 62.5 62.5 5.5 3.7 8.410 124163 
 
 
3. The case study 
This section draws from the interviews conducted with the MNE's senior officials in host northern 
(Sweden) and southern countries (India and China). We shall begin by introducing the firm and 
proceed to explore its innovation strategies, the implications for the constitution of a GIN and its 
bearing on the innovation competence and capability in the host countries. 
 
3.1 A brief profile 
ICT1 was founded in 1984 by a small group of computer scientists from Stanford University. It 
produced the first router in 1986, making different types of network that connect with each other 
reliably and thus contributing significantly to communications revolution. Over the years, ICT1 
emerged as the worldwide leader in Internet Protocol-based (IP) networking solutions which has 
become an essential part of business, education, government and home communications. The 
product and process innovations by ICT1 enable its customers to harness ICT for increasing their 
productivity and efficiency. At present ICT1 is present in 165 countries with 550 offices and around 
30 manufacturing sites across 165 countries.  
Table 4 shows how ICT1 has been recording an impressive growth in sales (except in 2009, due to 
global economic crisis), consistently increasing the number of employees (to 72,600 in 2010).  
Also, ICT1 has the biggest Internet e-commerce site in the world. Over 90 percent transactions of 
its global business are completed on the Internet. As a global leader in fixed-line communication 
equipment, since its listing in 1990, the annual revenue of ICT1 has risen from $ 69 million to $ 40 
billion in the fiscal year of 2010. In 2009, it ranked 57 in Fortune 500, and was chosen as the most 
respectable company in the world for the eighth time in Fortune. ICT1 has also got the honour of 
being the 17th in “2008 Global Top Brands”.  
 
 
 
Table 4: Sales and employment growth in ICT1 since 2005 
Year Sales (US $ 
Billion) 
Sales growth 
(%) 
Employment 
added 
2004 22.0   
2005 24.8   
2006 28.5 15 11500 
2007 34.9 23 11600 
2008 39.5 13 4500 
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2009 36.1 -9.0 6600 
2010 40 11  
Total employment in 2010 72,600 
Source: Annual reports of ICT1 
 
3.2 Innovation and capability building strategy within the firm 
3.2.1 High R&D intensity  
As a company operating in a high-tech industry with relatively short product cycle and fierce 
competition, ICT1 has been providing top priority for innovation. Since the company's inception, 
ICT1 engineers have been leaders in the development of Internet Protocol (IP)-based networking 
technologies. This tradition of innovation continues with industry-leading products in the core areas 
of routing and switching, as well as advanced technologies in areas such as Home Networking, IP 
Telephony, Optical, Network Security, Storage Networking and Wireless LAN.  Indeed, R&D 
expenditure as a proportion of sales has been maintained consistently at two digit level, even in the 
year of economic crisis (see Table 5). 
 
Table 5: R&D intensity in ICT1 
Year R&D Expenditure 
$ billion 
R&D intensity 
(%) 
      
2005 3.3 13.31 
2006 4 14.04 
2007 4.5 12.89 
2008 5.2 13.16 
2009 5.2 14.40 
2010   
 
3.2.2 Innovation is not R&D alone 
Innovation goes however much beyond investment in R&D only. Innovation is not conceived as 
technological innovation alone but also as business innovation Quoting from the interview in 
Sweden “The innovation is therefore driven by the transitions that are impacting our customers. 
Technology is just an enabler”. This is also evident from statements in various annual reports and 
the initiatives undertaken.  
“In our opinion, the key to long-term success in the high-technology industry is 
ongoing strategic investment and innovation, and we intend to continue to take good 
business risks. Our innovation strategy requires a unique combination of internal 
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development, partnerships, and acquisitions. In our opinion, for companies to lead in 
the technology industry they must be able to do all three” (annual Report 2005) 
 
3.3 Leader in network systems with a networked approach to innovation 
ICT1 conceives innovation essentially as an interactive process. It is a typical case of open 
innovation within a global network. As clearly stated in the chairman address to the share holders 
(Annual Report 2010) “We have learnt much about the power of collaboration within our own 
company, and we are working to share this knowledge with our customers every day”. 
 
3.3.1 Strong internal network 
The importance of internal network to this strategy is best summed up from the following statement 
from interview: “Everyone of our 65.000 employees can interact with R&D….also the guys at 
technical operations support sales. Sales forces are important because they come back with the 
request of our customers. The most stupid thing is to create an R&D with its own world when you 
have 65000 employees that know what is happening. In our innovation process we included also the 
users directly influencing R&D. So forget about the R&D as a separate thing”. Further, “…each of 
the employees at ICT1 can contribute directly to our innovation  on our website and gain a prize, or 
becoming manager directors etc. The success of this is that it was not a single guy coming with the 
idea but people working together. To collaborate they can also use tele-presence then we have a 
filtered process with boards”. 
R&D labs are themselves a global network. While, the main R&D labs are located in Silicon Valley 
and in Bangalore, smaller labs have been established in other locations as well (including China and 
Europe). Overall, there are around 30 R&D establishments across the world.  
Concerning southern countries, interviews reveal three main motivations for R&D off-shoring.  
The first is to access to large and growing market, having direct knowledge of customer needs and 
showing high degree of commitment. “For a market like the size of China, you need to build 
products and have a manufacturing process aligned to the launching of these products into market, 
which allows you to be cost-competitive. You have to show all the time that you have a long-term 
commitment, and if you don't have a manufacturing and R&D presence and you're not actually 
coordinating those investments with what you're doing from the standpoint of sales and marketing, 
you will lose relevance”.  A specific issue is to reduce R&D cost to compete against local low-cost 
competitors. This is important in China where ICT1 has at least 10 competitors and companies such 
as Huawei, ZTE, Juniper are challenging ICT1's position in some markets. By establishing a R&D 
center in China, ICT1 can reduce R&D cost by accessing local qualified R&D personnel; on the 
hand, it can develop new products according to the local market demands.  
The second is to enable the firm to respond in real-time to transformations affecting nowadays 
societies. Southern countries is where change is currently happening. Education and health systems 
are changing, urbanisation is taking place (around 700 millions people will be organized in the 
coming 10 years in 20 important cities, in particular in China and India), new technologies are taken 
up (China is the fastest growing country with the adoption of network technologies for voice calls). 
This generates new demands and needs to which the company need to adapt. Research in these 
markets is necessary to enable real-time response to these changes, which can then be applied to 
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northern markets as well. For instance, to respond to the urbanisation challenge, ICT1 opened a 
community innovation platform foundation in New Delhi and participated to build an almost 
complete new city in South Korea.  
So if you are asking where the developing part takes place or from where the smart ideas 
come from, for this specific transition related to smart cities, this is happening there and not 
here. This will drive the technologies, boxes and equipments that we have to deliver.  
Similarly, the R&D centre in Shanghai will be geared to networking technologies for voice calls.  
The third motivation is to access the large pool of local skilled people and talent.  
If you want the top talent in your company you need to provide them with flexible working 
spaces. Without the right talents you cannot be innovative. The reason why ICT1 opened a 
second HQ in Bangalore in India was not just to have sales office for 1 billion people leaving 
there, but to get access to the talent that you need. 
In China, there is a large ICT1 R&D centre in Shanghai, where 66 higher educational institutions 
and 122 vocational schools are located (around 126,900 and 56,000 graduates per year, 
respectively). Conversely, the establishment of R&D centres in Europe seems to take place 
primarily through the acquisition of local firms with R&D centres that are then maintained. The 
acquisition of specialised knowledge held locally seems therefore the primary motivation (see also 
Section 3.3.2) driving offshoring. Presence in the market and fiscal reasons has also been 
mentioned.  
 
3.3.2 Strong external networks  
Consistently with its views on innovation, external networks are of essential to ICT1's strategy. A 
strategy of partnerships, strategic alliances and acquisitions is being actively pursued to this end.  
 
3.3.3 Developing Partnerships 
Partnership with public authorities are developed in particular in emerging markets like China, 
India, Mexico where the main societal transitions are going on, for example, for education or 
healthy issues.  
For fiscal 2006, we reorganized our sales theaters and added the Emerging Markets theater 
in order to take advantage of the growth potential of these countries. We met with 
government leaders around the world in countries such as India, China, Germany, Saudi 
Arabia, and Russia. Our conversations centered around how ICT1 could help their countries 
develop a stronger economy through Internet access to education, healthcare, and business 
opportunities. As these countries begin to deploy Internet solutions, they look to ICT1 as a 
partner and resource vital to their success. As a result, product revenue in ICT1’s Emerging 
Markets theater grew 38 percent on a year-over-year basis—the highest growth percentage 
of all five theaters. Growth in Emerging Markets is the truest example of the power of the 
network now (Annual Report 2006). 
A specific example is the initiative on smart cities (see Box 1), where ICT1 is providing the 
communication infrastructure for those cities. The smart cities are developed also in cooperation 
with other companies for example, a huge developer company.  
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Box 1: 
Karnataka Government signs MoU with ICT1 to evolve an intelligent, sustainable city 
On February 12, 2009 ICT1 announced a pilot program to assist the government of Karnataka in developing 
a road map for an intelligent and sustainable Bengaluru city.  
As part of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), ICT1 will work with the Karnataka government to 
share relevant experiences and best practices from its work in other parts of the world, for developing a 
world-class urban infrastructure for the citizens of Karnataka.  
This project is part of ICT1’s global ‘Intelligent Urbanisation’ initiative announced today from ICT1’s 
Globalisation Centre East, designed to help cities around the world use the network as the fourth utility for 
integrated city management, a better quality of life for citizens, and economic development. Bringing 
together a broad portfolio of products, services, partners and solutions across ICT1, the initiative is initially 
focused on intelligent, sustainable solutions for public safety and security, transportation, buildings, energy, 
health care and education. 
This partnership builds on ICT1’s technology expertise around the world in cities like San Francisco, 
Amsterdam and Seoul to help promote sustainable, intelligent urban development practices. 
As part of the pilot program, ICT1 will work with Karnataka State Road Transport Corp. and the Karnataka 
police to improve public safety and security around one of the major bus terminals in Bengaluru. The project 
will help enable public safety and security at strategic points within the terminal, offering remote monitoring 
capabilities with real time information.  
 
As part of this strategy, ICT1 is active in developing partnerships around key societal challenges 
both in India and China. In India, ICT1’s Globalisation Centre in Bengaluru, established as part of a 
total investment in India of US$1.16 billion, is a showcase of the technology components of the 
company’s Intelligent Cities vision. The initiatives at the campus include solar lighting and daylight 
harvesting, rainwater and treated sewage water harvesting for irrigation and fertilization, network-
controlled lighting and HVAC systems, and a ubiquitous security system. Through the various 
programmes and initiatives that it has undertaken at the Globalisation Centre in Bengaluru, ICT1 is 
demonstrating its commitment to pollution reduction, environmental protection and continuous 
improvement in India. According to the website: 
ICT1 chose India as the location from which to expand its globalization vision because India 
has a highly skilled workforce, supportive government, innovative customers and world-
class partners that already have global capabilities. 
In China, ICT1’s board chairman and chief executive officer announced on 1 November 2007 that 
innovation and sustainable development would become the strategic focus of Cisco’s development 
in China, and committed to make an investment of 16 billion US dollars in China in the next five 
years, including a significant increase in local procurement, education, financing lease, R&D, as 
well as sales and service. On 16 April 2008, the CEO made his second visit to China, and 
announced the company’s developing strategy and blueprint in the next stage. As an important step of 
“innovation and sustainable development”, ICT1 will strengthen its cooperation with Chinese government 
and industries, and try to match with all-level goals of economics, society and environment in China". 
 
 D6.1: Research papers on “Fragmentation of GINs and capability building in the automotive, ICT 
and agro-processing industries”  -  
“GINed for innovation, technological up-gradation and capability building.  
The case of a truly global, innovative and networked firm” 
 
 
Page 236 of 240 
3.3.4 Path dependency and acquisitions 
Stressing the path dependency involved in the process of innovation, List (1841) remarked: “The 
present state of the nation is the result of accumulation of all discoveries inventions, improvements 
perfections and exertions of all generations which have lived before us; they form the mental capital 
of the present human race, and every separate nation is productive only in the proportion in which it 
has known how to appropriate these attainments of former generations and to increase them by its 
own acquirements”. 
It appears that the ICT1 considers innovation not only as interactive process but also path 
dependent.  This is reflected in the firm's strategy of acquiring leading firms in specific areas, which 
in turn provide ICT1 with access to both the accumulated knowledge and human capital of these 
firms and to their markets.  
At the beginning, acquisitions were mainly targeting US-based companies. Later the company 
started to acquire worldwide. To quote from the interview in Sweden:  
The fact is that we acquired more than 140 companies and all have their small R&D labs etc. 
So it is a constant process of integrating those companies and taking from them the right 
potential. For example in Belgium we acquired a company for video set up box , and we 
have an R&D centre in this company. So we are spread worldwide but the two main ones are 
in the two HQs. We are also present for example in China in Shanghai and in Beijing. 
Table 6 shows that ICT1 continues its strategy of acquisitions. Indeed, 14 companies were acquired 
since 2008 (see table 6). It is evident that the acquired firms were leaders in the respective areas. 
 
Table 6: Important acquisitions by ICT1 since 2008 
Year Name of the Company Area of Expertise 
Cognio, Inc. leader in wireless spectrum analysis and 
management for wireless networks 
Latigent, LLC,  Leading provider of web-based business 
intelligence and analytics reporting solutions 
focused on contact centers;  
Nuova Systems, Inc.,  Developer of next-generation products for 
the data center market;  
Securent, Inc.,  Leading provider of policy management 
software for enterprises;  
Navini Networks, Inc., A  leader in the mobile WiMAX broadband 
wireless industry 
 
 
 
2008 
DiviTech, A/S,   A leader in the digital-service management 
market 
Post Path, Inc leader in email and calendaring software 
Jabber, Inc. Principal provider of presence and 
messaging software 
Pure Digital Technologies, Inc.,  Creator of the Flip Video family of cameras 
and a pioneer in developing consumer-
friendly video solutions 
 
 
2009 
Tidal Software, Inc. Developer of intelligent application 
management and automation solutions 
Starent Networks Corp. Provider of IP-based mobile infrastructure 
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Starent Networks Corp. for carriers 
Tandberg ASA,  Leader in video communications 
ScanSafe, Inc.,  Provider of hosted web security  
 
2010 
CoreOptics Inc.  Designer of digital signal processing 
solutions. 
Source: Compiled from the annual report of relevant years 
 
3.3.5 Building strategic alliances 
ICT1 has been very actively developing strategic alliances with other firms including competitors 
and other stakeholders. It is worth noting that in the United States ICT1 has 
partnerships/collaboration with Microsoft  - one of the strong competitors in some areas. Microsoft 
is also a valuable customer of ICT1 for network equipments. This strategy is pursued in both India 
and China.  
In India, ICT1 has forged firm collaboration with the largest IT Company in India which is a 
competitor of ICT1 in certain areas (see box 2). 
 
Box2: 
Strategic alliance between ICT1 and Tata Consultancy Services, India 
 
On 10 February 2009 ICT1 and Tata Consultancy Services (TCS) announced their strategic alliance to 
develop and deliver information technology (IT) service solutions to help customers build or evolve next-
generation data centres by taking advantage of the network as a platform. Under the agreement, TCS will 
build a new technology practice focused on ICT1’s industry-leading data centre networking and security 
solutions. The companies also announced the formation of a ICT1® Technology Lab at the TCS campus in 
Chennai, India. 
ICT1 and TCS are developing go-to-market solutions that meet the infrastructure and network requirements 
of global corporations. Both companies will invest in skills development and training labs to provide an end-
to-end solution to meet customer requirements. 
This strategic alliance illustrates ICT1 commitment to building relationships with new partners in emerging 
parts of the world that will take advantage of new virtualised approaches such as ‘software as a service’. 
The TCS and ICT1 strategic alliance will initially focus on India as well as mutual enterprise customers in 
the United States and the United Kingdom in the key verticals of banking and finance services, telecom, and 
government as well as small and medium-sized business.  
The ICT1 Technology Lab in Chennai will allow TCS to develop network-based data centre solutions, test 
frameworks, develop skills and certify employees in ICT1 data centre technologies. The lab will also allow 
ICT1 and TCS to illustrate proof-of-concepts and IT and networking methodologies for client-specific 
business processes. 
 
In China, ICT1 has close cooperation with local companies, most of whom are part of ICT1’s supply chain, 
especially companies located in Guangdong Province. ICT1 hopes to make these SMEs part of ICT1 and 
help them upgrade. ICT1 has already made an investment of 700 million US dollars in many local 
companies, and has plans to make an additional investment of over $350 million during the coming five 
years.  
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3.3.6 Linkages with Knowledge generating organizations: Competence building in the South 
Being a truly innovative, global and networked firm, the strategy of building and sustaining technological 
competence by ICT1 involves networking not only within the firm and other firms, suppliers and customers 
but also the other knowledge generating organizations like universities around the world. ICT1 collaborates 
with universities worldwide both for educational purpose (e.g. special graduated programmes) and also for 
innovation purpose. The main collaborations are in US and in India. ICT1 has dedicated resources, budgets 
and people to use for developing universities collaboration. 
Special mention may be made of the Global Talent Acceleration Programme (GTAP), which ICT1 
established in Amman, Jordan, and Johannesburg, South Africa, as well as in Bangalore and New 
Delhi in India (see box 3). Partnering with public and private institutions (such as schools, 
universities, businesses, no-profit and government organizations) the initiative aims at enabling new 
recruits (whose skills are generic) to develop the highly specialised skills needed by ICT1 (eg, 
networking).  
As part of this strategy, a number of initiatives are being taken both in India and China.   
In India, fully-fledged and formal linkages with institutions are yet to take place. There are  many instances 
of interaction with academic institutions like the Indian Institute of Science Bangalore and there is a growing 
attention to it, but linkages remain mostly informal in nature, for instance, through highly knowledgeable 
persons who have joined from the academia or the participation of ICT1's personnel in research seminars, 
workshops, conferences.  Interactions also takes place in the form of internships for students (approximately 
150 to 200 or even more in some years).  During the interview the ICT1 representative in India said that “ I 
visit many campuses a year and I feel there is a lot of talent and quality  in our colleges but if you ask 
whether the quality has deteriorated from past may be it is so.  For instance the IITs which used to produce 
global business leaders about 10 years back are not doing that any more”. 
 
 
Box 3 
ICT1 initiative to help meet demand for networking professionals 
On 20 May 2009 ICT1 announced that the first cohort of students has graduated from the Global Talent 
Acceleration Programme (GTAP) Academy in New Delhi. The programme, launched last year in India, 
aimed at developing home-grown technical skills and popularize career certification thereby bridging the gap 
between demand and supply for industry-ready professionals in the networking industry. 
The GTAP Academy in New Delhi is operated jointly by ICT1 and business partners Aricent and HCL. 
There are nine associate Customer Support Engineer (CSE) delegates graduating in the first Delhi cohort.  
GTAP has particular relevance in India, where demand for networking skills could require an additional 
118,000 professionals by 2009, according to a 2004-2009 IDC report on global skills. Designed to be 
sustainable, delegates receive a salary and go through training programmes in relatively small groups. This 
enables GTAP to put a strong emphasis on technical and professional training, mentorship and on-the-job 
training. 
The GTAP programme leader at ICT1, said, "In addition to in-depth product and technical knowledge, 
engineers also require sophisticated management and communications skills. ICT1's Global Talent 
Acceleration Programme has been specifically designed to cater to this need and support the future growth of 
ICT1 service delivery in developing markets ".  
Initiated in 2007, GTAP works towards accelerating business development and growth opportunities for 
ICT1 and its partners in emerging economies where technical resources are known to be scarce. GTAP trains 
associate and experienced professionals as network consulting engineers, project managers, customer support 
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engineers, system engineers, and account managers, who subsequently can be absorbed into the professional 
workforce at ICT1, its partners, and the wider industry. 
 
In China, though ICT1 has its own R&D center in Shanghai, it pays more attention to cooperation 
with local universities. It established the “Green Science and Technology Joint Laboratory” with 
Tsinghua University in April 2009, which focuses on developing wireless sensor networks and 
intelligent technology solutions to urbanization. In December 2009, it set up the “Next Generation 
Broadcast (NGB) Joint Laboratory” with the State Administration of Radio Film and Television. In 
February 2010, it set up the “Chongqing University of Posts and Telecommunications – ICT1 
Green Science and Technology Joint Research Laboratory” with Chongqing University of Posts and 
Telecommunications. Besides, ICT1 is participating in important programs in China, such as next 
generation Internet, mobile TV programs, collaborating with the Research Institute of State 
Administration of Radio Film and Television. ICT1 also pays a lot of attention to educate and 
cultivate Chinese talents in networks. By the year 2011, ICT1 will build more than 300 ICT1 
network technology colleges in many higher vocational colleges, aiming at increasing by 100 
thousand students the total number of students trained in ICT1’s network technology colleges. 
Finally, ICT1 spent 20 million US dollars on establishing Guanghua-ICT1 Leadership Institute 
jointly with Peking University. This is the first time that ICT1 built an international academic 
exchange platform with domestic education institutions oriented towards senior management 
personnel to cultivate international management talents. 
 
3.3.7 The coordination of the network 
The efficient coordination of the network is crucial to the company. A key factor is the move 
towards cross-functional integration. The company shifted from a command and control strategy to 
a strategy where each single employee of the group can participate in the innovation process (see 
the webpage in relation to the prize for new ideas). The innovation is then filtered through boards 
and councils composed by executives located in different sites. This strategy aims at mobilising all 
knowledge in the system, while acknowledging that the HQ in Silicon Valley cannot have good 
knowledge of what's happening everywhere.  The keywords are "anywhere, anytime, mobility" (see 
interview in Sweden) 
Communication among the group (in different locations) is done mainly at virtual level (tele-
conferences with advanced techniques – e.g. TP rooms and holograms - allow the transfer of 
knowledge and meeting among people located geographically in different sites). Employees use 
shared ICT platforms for common work sections and communications (use of internal you tube, 
blogs etc).  
Face-to-face contacts are not crucial to this. When the second HQ in Bangalore was settled down 
executives from US where sent to the new location. However, this was not because of the need to 
transfer knowledge (this happens through the networking anyway) but to show the commitment of 
ICT1 had with the new site (which require face-to-face contacts). 
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4. Conclusions 
Literature argues that GINs have developed primarily because of the large availability of knowledge 
workers in the South, particularly as skill-starved northern MNEs are looking for new capabilities 
for promoting innovation. Against this background, this study deals specifically with two questions. 
First, is the simple availability of competence in southern countries actually driving the formation 
and substance of GINs?. Second, to what extent the innovation strategy of the firm is helpful in 
further strengthening the competence base in in those countries? To these questions, we have 
undertaken the case-study of a leading northern MNE having operations and undertaking R&D and 
other innovative activities in other northern countries and in southern countries.  
Concerning the first question, the central message of the case-study is that the formation of the 
global innovation network is intrinsic to the innovation strategy of the firm. Enabling the firm to 
respond in real time to the societal transformations is the primary objective of such innovation 
strategy. To this end, innovation is increasingly seen as an interactive process wherein collaboration 
with users, suppliers, competitors and other knowledge generating entities like universities is as 
important, if not more, than in-house R&D activities (quoting from the Sweden interview: 
"changing from 'knowledge is our power' to 'collaboration is our growth' "). Internal development, 
acquisitions (particularly of niche producers of specific technologies), partnerships (with national 
and local authorities), and strategic alliances (including with competing firms) are the four pillars of 
this strategy. Overall, these processes are driving an in-depth transformation of the very 
organisational structure of the firm: from a command-and-control to cross-functional integration 
(where each employee contribute to the innovation process). In this context, the availability of 
skilled manpower in the host country is only a necessary but not a sufficient condition in the 
formation of GINs. Indeed, the skill gap between India and China (as highlighted in Section 3) did 
not seem to make an important difference in the location decision of ICT1. Other factors appear to 
play an important role as well. While closeness to large markets and cost factors (particularly in 
R&D) remain, the case-study stresses the importance of developing countries as sources of new 
ideas. Societal transformations (eg, urbanisation) are happening very rapidly in southern countries. 
Their markets markets have various kinds of customers, whose demands are very dynamic and 
changing. These customers can be regarded as critical ones globally, and the feedback from those 
market can be then applied into the whole world.   
Concerning the second question, the case-study highlights a number of initiatives that the company 
is taking to help competence building in host (and specifically southern) countries. This includes 
interaction with universities and its other skill-generating activities.  However, such initiatives 
appears to have the primary objective of developing the very specific niche skills needed by ICT1. 
Such relatively narrow focus may have the potential danger of locking up further development. This 
calls for policy and institutions in India and China to take an active role and harness the presence of 
MNEs for strengthening their competence base and making their innovation system more vibrant.  
 
